Pope Benedict XVI's Critique of Capitalism

Earlier this summer Benedict urged the nations of the world to embrace each other in solidarity and work towards "an ever more just distribution" of wealth," warning that "It is not possible to continue using the wealth of the poorest countries with impunity, without them also being able to participate in world growth." (Zenit: "Pope Urges Just Distribution of Goods" June 1, 2007).

Benedict revisited this topic during his September 23 Angelus. Commenting on Jesus' parable of the "dishonest steward", Benedict remarked on the "equal distribution of goods":

Telling the Parable of the dishonest but very crafty administrator, Christ teaches his disciples the best way to use money and material riches, that is, to share them with the poor, thus acquiring their friendship, with a view to the Kingdom of Heaven. "Make friends for yourselves by means of unrighteous mammon," Jesus says, "so that when it fails they may receive you into the eternal habitations" (Lk 16: 9).

Money is not "dishonest" in itself, but more than anything else it can close man in a blind egocentrism. It therefore concerns a type of work of "conversion" of economic goods: instead of using them only for self-interest, it is also necessary to think of the needs of the poor, imitating Christ himself, who, as St Paul wrote: "though he was rich, yet for your sake he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich" (II Cor 8: 9). [...]

Catholic social doctrine has always supported that equitable distribution of goods is a priority. Naturally, profit is legitimate and, in just measure, necessary for economic development.

In his Encyclical Centesimus Annus, John Paul II wrote: "The modern business economy has positive aspects. Its basis is human freedom exercised in many other fields" (n. 32). Yet, he adds that capitalism must not be considered as the only valid model of economic organization (cf. ibid., n. 35).

Starvation and ecological emergencies stand to denounce, with increasing evidence, that the logic of profit, if it prevails, increases the disproportion between rich and poor and leads to a ruinous exploitation of the planet.

Instead, when the logic of sharing and solidarity prevails, it is possible to correct the course and direct it towards an equitable, sustainable development.

Michael Joseph of Vox Nova has conveyed his thoughts on Benedict's remarks (along with a lively combox discussion) in "The Logic of Profit and the Logic of Equal Distribution" Vox Nova Sept. 24, 2007).

To this I wanted to contribute (in what meager way I can) by exploring other addresses of Pope Benedict on the economy. . . . READ THE REST

Benedict's Address to the Latin American Bishop's Council (CELAM) - Brazil

In May 2007, Benedict made an apostolic journey to Brazil, during which he participated in the opening of the Fifth General Conference of the Bishops of Latin America and the Caribbean. Speaking of the necessity to establish "just structures -- without which a just order in society is not possible," Benedict addresses the insufficient promises of capitalism and Marxism:

Both capitalism and Marxism promised to point out the path for the creation of just structures, and they declared that these, once established, would function by themselves; they declared that not only would they have no need of any prior individual morality, but that they would promote a communal morality. And this ideological promise has been proved false. The facts have clearly demonstrated it. The Marxist system, where it found its way into government, not only left a sad heritage of economic and ecological destruction, but also a painful oppression of souls. And we can also see the same thing happening in the West, where the distance between rich and poor is growing constantly, and giving rise to a worrying degradation of personal dignity through drugs, alcohol and deceptive illusions of happiness.

Just structures are, as I have said, an indispensable condition for a just society, but they neither arise nor function without a moral consensus in society on fundamental values, and on the need to live these values with the necessary sacrifices, even if this goes against personal interest.

Where God is absent—God with the human face of Jesus Christ—these values fail to show themselves with their full force, nor does a consensus arise concerning them. I do not mean that non-believers cannot live a lofty and exemplary morality; I am only saying that a society in which God is absent will not find the necessary consensus on moral values or the strength to live according to the model of these values, even when they are in conflict with private interests.

On the other hand, just structures must be sought and elaborated in the light of fundamental values, with the full engagement of political, economic and social reasoning. They are a question of recta ratio and they do not arise from ideologies nor from their premises. Certainly there exists a great wealth of political experience and expertise on social and economic problems that can highlight the fundamental elements of a just state and the paths that must be avoided. But in different cultural and political situations, amid constant developments in technology and changes in the historical reality of the world, adequate answers must be sought in a rational manner, and a consensus must be created—with the necessary commitments—on the structures that must be established.

According to John Allen Jr., Benedict's critique of capitalism comes as no surprise to those familiar with Joseph Ratzinger's earlier work (National Catholic Reporter May 13, 2007):

Benedict XVI’s stinging criticism of both Marxism and capitalism this afternoon may have caught some off-guard used to thinking of him as a consumate conservative, but it shouldn’t surprise anyone who knows Joseph Ratzinger’s history. . . .

In 1988, then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger published a collection of essays under the title of Church, Ecumenism and Politics. In it, he argued that capitalism is little better than national socialism or communism, in that all three propose false idols (prosperity, the Volk, and the state, respectively). Ratzinger said that to build a humane civilization, the West must rediscover two elements of its past: its classical Greek heritage and its common Christian identity.

From the classical era, Ratzinger wrote, Europe should rediscover objective and eternal values that stand above politics, putting limits to power. Ratzinger used the Greek term eunomia to describe this concept of the good. In that sense, one could say that Ratzinger proposed a eunomic, rather than capitalist, model of Western culture.

Over the years, Ratzinger has been close to the Communio school within Catholic theology, which stresses the need for cultures to take their point of departure from the Christian gospel rather than secular ideologies. Its primary exponents have repeatedly criticized capitalism for promoting an ethos of individualism and “survival of the fittest” that is at odds with the communitarian thrust of Catholic social teaching.

Since becoming pope, Benedict has often criticized what he considers the injustices of a growing neo-liberal system of economic globalization.

Ratzinger on "Market Economy and Ethics"

The most extensive work that I could find online -- generously made available by the Acton Institute -- is Ratzinger's Market Economy and Ethics, a version of which was presented in 1985 in a symposium in Rome, “Church and Economy in Dialogue.” It was published in English under the title “Church and economy: Responsibility for the future of the world economy,” Communio 13 (Fall 1986): 199-204.

Ratzinger begins by challenging "the objection raised especially after the Second Vatican Council, that the autonomy of specialized realms is to be respected above all," including the autonomy of the free market from moral influence:

Following the tradition inaugurated by Adam Smith , this position holds that the market is incompatible with ethics because voluntary “moral” actions contradict market rules and drive the moralizing entrepreneur out of the game. For a long time, then, business ethics rang like hollow metal because the economy was held to work on efficiency and not on morality. 4 The market's inner logic should free us precisely from the necessity of having to depend on the morality of its participants. The true play of market laws best guarantees progress and even distributive justice.

The great successes of this theory concealed its limitations for a long time. But now in a changed situation, its tacit philosophical presuppositions and thus its problems become clearer. Although this position admits the freedom of individual businessmen, and to that extent can be called liberal, it is in fact deterministic in its core. It presupposes that the free play of market forces can operate in one direction only, given the constitution of man and the world, namely, toward the self-regulation of supply and demand, and toward economic efficiency and progress.

This determinism, in which man is completely controlled by the binding laws of the market while believing he acts in freedom from them, includes yet another and perhaps even more astounding presupposition, namely, that the natural laws of the market are in essence good (if I may be permitted so to speak) and necessarily work for the good, whatever may be true of the morality of individuals. These two presuppositions are not entirely false, as the successes of the market economy illustrate. But neither are they universally applicable and correct, as is evident in the problems of today's world economy. . . .

Even if the market economy does rest on the ordering of the individual within a determinate network of rules, it cannot make man superfluous or exclude his moral freedom from the world of economics. It is becoming ever so clear that the development of the world economy has also to do with the development of the world community and with the universal family of man, and that the development of the spiritual powers of mankind is essential in the development of the world community. These spiritual powers are themselves a factor in the economy: the market rules function only when a moral consensus exists and sustains them.

Ratzinger follows this with an observation about the growing attraction of Third World nations to a centralized economy by those who "identify the ground of their misery in the market economy, which they see as a system of exploitations, as institutionalised sin and injustice" -- who embrace centralization with something akin to a "religious fervor." Ratzinger summarizes the discussion as follows:

For while the market economy rests on the beneficial effect of egoism and its automatic limitation through competing egoisms, the thought of just control seems to predominate in a centralized economy, where the goal is equal rights for all and proportionate distribution of goods to all. The examples adduced thus far are certainly not encouraging, but the hope that one could, nonetheless, bring this moral project to fruition is also not thereby refuted. It seems that if the whole were to be attempted on a stronger moral foundation, it should be possible to reconcile morality and efficiency in a society not oriented toward maximum profit, but rather to self-restraint and common service. Thus in this area, the argument between economics and ethics is becoming ever more an attack on the market economy and its spiritual foundations, in favor of a centrally controlled economy, which is believed now to receive its moral grounding.

Capitalism and Marxism: Philosophical "Siamese Twins"?

Though sympathetic to this "reconciliation of economics and ethics," Ratzinger rejects the Marxist proposal. His criticism is fascinating: though it presents itself as the antithesis to the market economy, the centrally-administered Marxist economy belies the same underlying philosophical determinism as its utilitarian-capitalist neighbor:

This determinism includes the renunciation of ethics as an independent entity relevant to the economy. [In Marxism], religion is traced back to economics as the reflection of a particular economic system and thus, at the same time, as an obstacle to correct knowledge, to correct action — as an obstacle to progress, at which the natural laws of history aim. . . . It is also presupposed that history, which takes its course from the dialectic of negative and positive, must, of its inner essence and with no further reasons being given, finally end in total positivity. That the Church can contribute nothing positive to the world economy on such a view is clear; its only significance for economics is that it must be overcome.

Ratzinger notes with concern as well the typical hostility towards the Catholic faith -- citing the examples of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, and Rockefeller in 1969, both of whom saw the Catholic majority in Latin America as an obstacle to relations with the United States and its economic expansion. Ratzinger notes the irony:

In both these remarks, religion — here a Christian denomination — is presupposed as a socio-political, and hence as an economic-political factor, which is fundamental for the development of political structures and economic possibilities. This reminds one of Max Weber's thesis about the inner connection between capitalism and Calvinism , between the formation of the economic order and the determining religious idea. Marx's notion seems to be almost inverted: it is not the economy that produces religious notions, but the fundamental religious orientation that decides which economic system can develop. The notion that only Protestantism can bring forth a free economy — whereas Catholicism includes no corresponding education to freedom and to the self-discipline necessary to it, favoring authoritarian systems instead — is doubtless even today still very widespread

Ratzinger calls for a “self-criticism of the Christian confessions," initiating a dialogue with those who manage the economy and countering the prejudice that would confine Christianity to the private realm, leaving the professional businessman to abide solely by the "laws of the market." According to Ratzinger, it is only in joining the market with a solid ethical foundation (sustained by religious conviction) that the pursuit of the common good can be accomplished. In fact, as we so often see today -- in tabloid stories of corporate scandals -- "the decline of such discipline can actually cause the laws of the market to collapse."

Ratzinger adds this note of caution to both parties [emphasis mine]:

A morality that believes itself able to dispense with the technical knowledge of economic laws is not morality but moralism. As such it is the antithesis of morality. A scientific approach that believes itself capable of managing without an ethos misunderstands the reality of man. Therefore it is not scientific. Today we need a maximum of specialized economic understanding, but also a maximum of ethos so that specialized economic understanding may enter the service of the right goals.

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Depends on your definition of "capitalism"?

If Benedict criticizes "capitalism", it seems to me he is referring more accurately to neo-liberalism, the worldview which Pope John Paul II described in Ecclesia in America:

More and more, in many countries of America, a system known as “neoliberalism” prevails; based on a purely economic conception of man, this system considers profit and the law of the market as its only parameters, to the detriment of the dignity of and the respect due to individuals and peoples. At times this system has become the ideological justification for certain attitudes and behavior in the social and political spheres leading to the neglect of the weaker members of society. Indeed, the poor are becoming ever more numerous, victims of specific policies and structures which are often unjust.

and condemned as well in Centesimus Annus (in addressing the question of whether 'capitalism' could be endorsed by Catholics:

. . . The answer is obviously complex. If by "capitalism" is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, even though it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a "business economy", "market economy" or simply "free economy". But if by "capitalism" is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality, and which sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and religious, then the reply is certainly negative.

The necessary corrective to such abuses, according to John Paul II, is "support must be given to all those who are examples of honesty in the administration of public finances and of justice," and support for "the process of democratization", which provides for greater control over potential abuses:

“The rule of law is the necessary condition for the establishment of an authentic democracy”. For democracy to develop, there is a need for civic education and the promotion of public order and peace. In effect, “there is no authentic and stable democracy without social justice. Thus the Church needs to pay greater attention to the formation of consciences, which will prepare the leaders of society for public life at all levels, promote civic education, respect for law and for human rights, and inspire greater efforts in the ethical training of political leaders”.

(Ecclesia in America, No. 57).

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Michael Joseph states with conviction:

Capitalism, which Smith outlines in his magisterial Wealth of Nations, is founded upon an ethics of sentiment and want and takes on the form of exchange between parties–I give you what you want and you give me what I want. This is why Enlightment liberty must always be coupled with capitalism. If reason is not the arbitor of proper action, then all people must be free to pursue their wants according to sentiment. Toss in some J.S. Mill and Bentham in order to give capitalism the flavor of utilitarian mode–I am at liberty to pursue my wants, which I decipher from my sentiments, as long as such a pursuit works for the benefit of the majority. That is the capitalist/utilitarian ethic. . . .

[I]t is true without a hesitation that the capitalist ethic is fundamentally at odds with the entire moral tradition of the Catholic faith, and that the capitalist ethic (to use the words of Aladair MacIntyre) is a rival morality to Catholicism. Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI understood this. Of course, the Catholic defenders of capitalism never care to debate its intellectual formulation for they know it is flawed. Instead, they refer us to the “material prosperity” of free market societies in order to justify the good of capitalism. But what else is such an empirical reliance than a consequentialist defense of a system that rejects the dignity of the human person (indeed, there is no person!) and reduces societal interaction to mere exchange!

Is the "free economy" and Catholic social teaching ultimately irreconcilable? -- Michael Therrien's essay John Paul II’s Use of the Term Neo-Liberalism in Ecclesia in America challenges precisely this claim. For Therrien, neoliberalism is but one possible outcome, "depending on the moral disposition of the actors within the market." He contends:

the Church has elevated certain elements of the classical liberal agenda—and without compromise—by divorcing liberalism from its historic excesses. By situating liberalism within a Christian philosophical and theological framework, the Church has sufficiently anchored liberalism’s vision of individual liberty and human rights in a proper anthropology. This process began with Pius IX’s 1864 Syllabus of Errors, which condemned the radical elements of the liberal movement, and has continued all the way through John Paul II’s encyclical letter, Fides et Ratio. By asserting this, however, I am also recognizing that the Church has condemned the excesses and abuses of liberalism. Among these would be the errors of atomistic individualism, the absolute right to private property, the idea that law originates from the will of the people, and the rejection of legitimate authority, especially the moral authority of the Church. Yet I would suggest that these condemnations, and others, have been carefully focused on specific errors of liberalism so as not to disregard many of the key insights that liberals advanced, such as religious liberty, freedom of association, and economic liberty. Admittedly, the Church has prudently taken more than a century to develop her teaching on these matters. Consequently, the nuancing of liberalism has been gradual and slow to develop.

In like manner, says Therrien, John Paul’s condemnation of neo-liberalism is not tantamount to a wholesale condemnation of the free economy as an economic system:

Neo-liberalism simply reflects those moral dispositions that are unacceptable to the Church in the marketplace. Thus, neo-liberalism is not synonymous with the free economy, nor does the market necessarily produce these excesses even though it might appear that way. I would even suggest that this moral disposition precedes any economic system, in as much as it is part and parcel of man’s fallen nature.

This distinction between the free economy and neo-liberalism is absolutely necessary if one is to properly understand the Church’s teaching about the economic order.

On the consequences of economic reductionism -- subordinating human dignity to profit and the "invisible hand of the market" -- Therrien asks a question which I would pose to Michael Joseph (and perhaps Benedict):

Yet is this intrinsic to the free economy—insofar as the free market refers to the voluntary exchange of goods and services and the protection of property rights—or is this simply a reflection of the moral blindness of those who espouse such a minimalist view of the human person? In other words, is it impossible to admit that individuals are capable of moving beyond selfish interest when acting in the market? Or is market activity fundamentally about greed?

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One can appreciate Ratzinger's recognition of the "proper jurisdiction" of theologian and economist, so to speak. To reiterate:

A morality that believes itself able to dispense with the technical knowledge of economic laws is not morality but moralism. As such it is the antithesis of morality. A scientific approach that believes itself capable of managing without an ethos misunderstands the reality of man. Therefore it is not scientific.

Or, to quote Gregory M. A. Gronbacher: "No matter how sublime the theology, it is no substitute for genuine economic knowledge, especially when the goal is to analyze economic structures in terms of their moral significance."

This advice is echoed in Benedict's May 2007 address to the Latin Bishop's Conference where, according to Benedict, the task of the Church is not so much the prescription of specific economic policy as the reaffirmation of fundamental principles which would guide our actions:

This political task is not the immediate competence of the Church. Respect for a healthy secularity—including the pluralism of political opinions—is essential in the Christian tradition. If the Church were to start transforming herself into a directly political subject, she would do less, not more, for the poor and for justice, because she would lose her independence and her moral authority, identifying herself with a single political path and with debatable partisan positions. The Church is the advocate of justice and of the poor, precisely because she does not identify with politicians nor with partisan interests. Only by remaining independent can she teach the great criteria and inalienable values, guide consciences and offer a life choice that goes beyond the political sphere. To form consciences, to be the advocate of justice and truth, to educate in individual and political virtues: that is the fundamental vocation of the Church in this area. And lay Catholics must be aware of their responsibilities in public life; they must be present in the formation of the necessary consensus and in opposition to injustice.

Just structures will never be complete in a definitive way. As history continues to evolve, they must be constantly renewed and updated; they must always be imbued with a political and humane ethos—and we have to work hard to ensure its presence and effectiveness. In other words, the presence of God, friendship with the incarnate Son of God, the light of his word: these are always fundamental conditions for the presence and efficacy of justice and love in our societies.

Catholics have responded to this call in many different ways. One way is that of the Catholic Worker, taking on voluntary poverty in solidarity with the least among us.

Then there is the Acton Institute, which according to its stated mission seeks to "to promote a free, virtuous, and humane society" by integrating "Judeo-Christian truths with free market principles." Which sounds, to me at least, not unlike what then-Cardinal Ratzinger had in mind when he spoke of joining "specialized economic understanding" with ethical discipline and religious strength, so as to properly order our economic activity.

I am reminded here of the collaboration of theologians and economists in the realtively new school of economic personalism, which upon initial reading aims to develop a "nuanced synthesis of free-market economic science and the science of moral theology grounded in a personalist anthropology" -- a laudable if not challenging task. (For starters, see "The Need for Economic Personalism" (Markets and Morality Volume 1, Number 1. March 1998).

Elsewhere:

• Does the Pope Blast Capitalism?", by Fr. Robert Sirico. Responding to allegations that Jesus of Nazareth contains an indictment of capitalism.

Briefly: Recommended reading on 'Christianity and Democracy'

W. Lindsey Wheeler comments on my blog:

"How absurd is this:

[Citing Neuhaus]: "Democracy is a relative good, but it is superior to other orders because: 1) it is the form of government that, under the conditions of modernity, best accommodates the Christian understanding of human dignity;"

And then Chris you agree. Show me in Scripture where democracy is approved. Scripture approves only two forms of government--monarchy and mixed goverment (a republic, politeia).

I can not believe what I am reading. Why doesn't the church teach from its own Religious Divinely Inspired Writings?

Chris please Plato saw democracy as a disease of men. When their character becomes corrupt, democracy is the sign of that corruptness. Democracy breaks down righteousness and is the product of egalitarianism.

After constantly posting this Link: The Classical definition of a republic, is it all for nought?

Here is the scripture:

"...remember that you were at that time separated from Christ, alienated from the commonwealth (Politeias) of Israel,..." New Testament, Eph., 2.12

"But our commonwealth (Politeuma) is in heaven, and from it we await a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ,..." New Testament, Phl., 3.20

Tell me what is going on? Democracy is sign of the degeneracy of the people? Is not the Catholic Church about teaching the TRUTH? Why do you Chris continue to advocate democracy????? Why?

First, as to the distinction btw/ 'republic' and 'democracy', I refer you to I. Shawn McElhinney's post , on the oft-quoted remark by Benjamin Franklin, in which he observes that the structure of our government is moreso that of a republic than a strict democracy. I'll also wager that Fr. Neuhaus, for his talk of democray, is certainly aware of this distinction as well.

Second, there is more to Catholic tradition than an appreciation of Plato, and in matters of politics and economics (as well as other issues of morality) the Church isn't necessarily confined to a reading of the Scriptures, but the breadth of Catholic tradition over the centuries and the teaching authority of the Church.

To observe what Catholic tradition has to say with respect to constitutional democracy, I'd refer you to the many authors found on this website, among them George Weigel, Kenneth L. Grasso, Father John Courtney Murray (but of course), the relevant documents of the Second Vatican Council and papal encyclicals.

Among the readings the following might be worthwhile:

• Centesimus Annus: on the hundredth anniversary of Rerum Novarum Pope John Paul II, May 1, 1991.
• 'The Catholic Human Rights Revolution' and "Religious Freedom: The First Human Right"; "Catholicism and Democracy, the Other Twentieth Century Revolution" (pp. 7-50, Freedom and its Discontents: Catholicism Confronts Modernity;
• "Catholicism and Democracy: Parsing the Other Twentieth Century Revolution"; "Centesimus Annus: the Architecture of Freedom" and "Veritatis Splendor: Moral Truth and the Democratic Prospect" - Chapters 6-8, Soul of the World: Notes on the Future of Public Catholicism (Eerdmans, 1996).
• Liberalism, Democratic Capitalism, and the Catholic Human Rights Revolution, by Kenneth L. Grasso (a good articulation of John Paul II's criticism of secular liberalism as expressed in Centesimus Annus, if any). Faith and Reason Winter 1991.
• The Liberalism of John Paul II, Fr. Richard J. Neuhaus. First Things 73 (May 1997): 16-21.
• Christianity and Democracy formal statement of the Institute on Religion and Democracy (IRD).

I am confident that my readers will be able to provide numerous additional recommendations on this topic as well.

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Elsewhere in the comments W. Lindsey Wheeler wonders:

. . . the author does not respond and nobody else does either--why is that because we know we are promoting error? or are we too cowardly to address the situation? Or are we too high and mighty (too elitist) to respond?

I get between 12-20 commments a day on my various blogs, as well as various petitions of this or that nature. I work a vigorous day job and have much to occupy my evenings besides the internet, including a good amount of reading. Consequently, the time I do spend is particularly precious, and my friends' blogs generally receive preferential treatment. However, as my fellow readers know, if they find W. Lindsey Wheeler's comments worthy of response they are certainly invited to do so -- commenting on this blog is, of course, open to all save that they do so in civil fashion.

(A word of advice: call it the 'Fr. O'Leary Syndrome', but posting as many as 10 verbose comments in succession to a single post is a good indication that one might avail himself of a wonderful new device that is the fruit of modern technology: the blog). =)

Dr. Samuel Gregg: "Pope Benedict on Morality, Economics and the Market"

Dr. Samuel Gregg, Director, Center for Economic Personalism, addresses Benedict XVI's thought on the issue of the market economy in a recent article "Morality, Economics and the Market in the Thought of Benedict XVI", Economic Affairs, (2005-09-01) [.pdf format]:

. . . But does any of this suggest that Pope Benedict XVI has ever been or is likely to be an outspoken supporter of the market economy? The answer to this question is 'no'. As a theologian and Vatican official, Ratzinger has always recognised that, within the limits established by the principles of Catholic social teaching (e.g. the dignity of the person, the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity etc.), the precise configuration of the economy or the degree of government intervention in the economy are matters for prudential judgement by Catholics. One cannot repeat enough that Catholics are free to disagree among themselves about those matters that the Church identifies as being within prudential judgement territory. This embraces the vast majority of economic questions. Thus, because he is content to let Catholics discuss prudential matters among themselves, it is not surprising that very few direct discussions of economic matters are found in Ratzinger's writings.

A rare exception to Ratzinger's reticence to examine economic questions in any detail is a 1986 article entitled 'Church and Economy' [Communio 13, no. 3 (1986): 199-204]. Keeping in mind the context and time of the article, it provides a number of interesting insights into Ratzinger's thoughts about economic issues.

The first point to note is that Ratzinger underlines the failure and counterproductive effects of development programmes promoted by Western aid agencies and governments throughout the developing world (Ratzinger, 1986, p. 200). He goes on to suggest that new economic ideas will need to be considered if the developing world is to escape material poverty. If one recalls that much of the world in the 1980s still believed in the efficacy of such programmes (which even many on the political left now disown), it is possible to view Ratzinger as one of that relatively small number of intellectuals (secular or religious) who were willing to question the redistributionist orthodoxy that reigned in many political, government and church circles.

The most significant part, however, of Ratzinger's 1986 article was its analysis of some of the philosophical questions raised by free-market economies. Importantly, at no stage does Ratzinger question the market's superior wealth-creating capacities. Indeed, he stresses that market economies have facilitated much prosperity throughout the world (Ratzinger, 1986, p. 201). Rather, Ratzinger devotes his attention to the moral, cultural and philosophical assumptions that may or may not underpin such economies. Ratzinger is, for instance, quite critical of what he describes as the deterministic tendencies that underlie the thought of some free-market advocates (Ratzinger, 1986, pp. 200-201). He argues that it is a mistake to assume that market exchanges in themselves provide sufficient moral validity for the nature or outcome of the exchange. The fact that an action is efficient or maximises utility is not, to Ratzinger's mind, sufficient to qualify it as morally good. Morality, to his mind, is not defined by utility. The market, in other words, does not somehow 'create' morality. Nor does the market render the demands of the moral life superfluous, and Ratzinger criticises those business figures who think and act as if it does. Significantly, Ratzinger notes that the tendency to substitute morality with economics is equally characteristic of Marxist thought in so far as figures such as Lenin accepted that 'there is in Marxism no grain of ethics, but only economic laws' (Ratzinger, 1986, p. 202). The expression of anti-determinist and anti-utilitarian views is hardly novel for an orthodox Catholic theologian. Indeed, many free-market promoters would join Ratzinger in insisting that the moral life cannot be reduced to economic analysis or market transactions. Many free-market supporters would also support Ratzinger's opposition to those who regard economics as the lens for understanding everything. Like all ideologies, 'economism' is deeply reductionist and thus anti-human in its implications.

Ratzinger further notes, as a historical irony, that many people dissatisfied with 'economistic' approaches have tended to embrace centrally planned economies as a way of attempting to bring moral guidance to economic life. This is despite the fact, as Ratzinger notes, that 'it is a fundamental error to suppose that a centralised economic system is a moral system in contrast to the mechanistic system of the market

None of this, however, is to suggest that Ratzinger believes that economics can be safely ignored. On the contrary, Ratzinger concludes his article by stressing that economics, as an intellectual discipline, enjoys a legitimate autonomy of its own. He even states that 'a morality that believes itself able to dispense with the technical knowledge of economic laws is not morality but moralism. As such it is the antithesis of morality' (Ratzinger, 1986, p. 204). He immediately adds that 'a scientific approach that believes itself capable of managing without an ethos [i.e. the demands of morality] misunderstands the reality of man. Therefore it is not scientific' (Ratzinger, 1986, p. 204). Synthesising these points, Ratzinger states that 'today we need a maximum of specialised economic understanding, but also a maximum of ethos so that specialised economic knowledge may enter the service of the right goals' (Ratzinger, 1986, p. 204). One suspects that those familiar with the commentaries of many Catholic intellectuals on economic matters will recognise that, on the basis of his 1986 article, few have come as close as Ratzinger to integrating an authentic Catholic approach to the moral life with an appreciation for the real technical knowledge yielded by modern economics into particular problems. It is a grave error, Ratzinger believes, for those thinking about how to address poverty to ignore what economics tells us about poverty. He is, however, insistent that economics in itself is not capable of determining the correct moral response to problems. Though a powerful instrument of analysis that can tell us how to do certain things, economics qua economics is incapable of telling us whether we ought to do certain things.

Our Holy Father was interviewed recently by Zenit News Service on the person and legacy of Pope John Paul II, in which he remarked:

. . . Initially, in speaking of the Pope's legacy, I forgot to mention the many documents that he left us -- 14 encyclicals, many pastoral letters, and others. All this is a rich patrimony that has not yet been assimilated by the Church.

My personal mission is not to issue many new documents, but to ensure that his documents are assimilated, because they are a rich treasure, they are the authentic interpretation of Vatican II. We know that the Pope was a man of the Council, that he internalized the spirit and the word of the Council. Through these writings he helps us understand what the Council wanted and what it didn't. This helps us to be the Church of our times and of the future.

Given his specific interest in realizing the thought of his predecessor, it seems to me that the Holy Father will likely draw from the riches of John Paul II's encyclical Centesimus Annus, with its commentary on economic affairs and liberal and socialist philosophy, especially in issuing a necessary corrective to neoliberalism along with a qualified approval of the "market economy" or "free market." It seems to me that Pope Benedict XVI is very much of the same mind as his predecessor on these matters.

Dr. Samuel Gregg concludes:

. . . In a 2002 speech, for instance ["Eucharist, Communion and Solidarity" L'Osservatore Romano, 13 November, 2002], he reminded his audience of the evils committed in the name of the atheistic 'Marxist socialist system' (Ratzinger, 2002, p. 8). Ratzinger then added: 'It is undeniable that the liberal model of the market economy, especially as moderated and corrected under the influence of Christian social ideas, has in some parts of the world led to great success' (Ratzinger, 2002, p. 8). The then future pope went on to suggest that the absence of such moral-cultural forces in market systems could have profoundly damaging effects, especially in developing nations. Hence, he insisted that the 'globalisation in technology and economy' needed to be accompanied by 'a new opening of conscience', so that individuals become more conscious of the global demands of Christian morality (Ratzinger, 2002, p. 9).

Here again we see that Ratzinger did not dispute or disparage the market's superiority in wealth-creation. Nor does he engage in knee-jerk anti-globalisation rhetoric. Rather, his concern remains with the moral-cultural context in which free enterprise and free exchange live, move and have their being. On this basis, we can safely assume that any combination of a market economy with cultures predominantly shaped by variants of libertinism, materialism and utilitarianism is going to worry Benedict XVI as much as it concerned John Paul II.

Given, however, that these are cultural rather than economic problems per se, it seems reasonable to suggest that Pope Benedict is unlikely to be insisting that the state ought to be the institution to address such matters. Certainly the Catholic Church does not teach that moral problems, be they 'personal' or 'social', somehow enjoy an automatic immunity from the law or state authority. Nevertheless, Ratzinger has insisted throughout his writings that any society's moral-culture is primarily shaped by individuals, families and civil associations, especially the Church. Nor should we underestimate the effects of Ratzinger's experience of the state-worship promoted by Nazi totalitarianism, not to mention his very Bavarian Catholic consciousness of the Kulturkampf (literally 'culture-struggle') waged against the Catholic Church in Germany by the Bismarckian state in the wake of German unification in 1871.

As many know, the founder of Western monasticism, St Benedict, is credited even by many non-believers as saving Western civilisation from the chaos that followed the Roman Empire's collapse. In a similar fashion, attention to renewing the sources of Western culture is likely to be a priority in Benedict XVI's pontificate. To this extent, the papacy's attention to economic questions under Pope Benedict is likely to be focused upon the relationship between the market and culture, an area that, until John Paul II, remained relatively unexamined by Catholic social teaching. If in doing so, Benedict XVI continues to make the same careful distinctions that he did as the theologian and Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, there is every reason to hope for thoughtful contributions to thinking about economic subjects from the new pope. Above all, we can expect the character of any such contributions to be neither 'right' nor 'left', but rather distinctly Catholic.

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Dr. Gregg is Director of Research at the Acton Institute and an Adjunct Professor at the John Paul II Pontifical Institute for Marriage and the Family within the Pontifical Lateran University. He is author of several books on Catholic social doctrine including Economic Thinking for the Theologically Minded (2001), Challenging the Modern World: Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II and the Development of Catholic Social Teaching (2003) and On Ordered Liberty (2003).

Related Links:

• Market Economy and Ethics translated by Stephen Wentworth Arndt, and republished by The Acton Institute -- courtesy of Dr. Johannes Stemmler, secretary emeritus of the BKU (Federation of Catholic Entrepreneurs) and secretary of Ordo socialis in Köln, Germany. This article appeared previously in English under the title "Church and economy: Responsibility for the future of the world economy," Communio 13 (Fall 1986): 199-204.

• Pope John Paul II Memorial Page, Acton Institute for the Study of Religion & Liberty.

• Review Essay: Challenging the Modern World: John Paul II/Karol Wojtyla and the Development of Catholic Social Teaching, by Gregory R. Beabout (Markets & Morality Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall 2001): "[Samuel] Gregg's work, which flows out of his doctoral research at Oxford under the direction of John Finnis, is perhaps the most careful scholarly effort in English to date that aims to show the influence of Wojtyla's prepontifical writing on the social encyclicals produced by John Paul II."

Usury in Catholic Tradition

We are discussing the issue of usury over at David Jones' la nouvelle theologie ("Usury & Social Justice" October 13, 2005), in reference to an article by Orthodox Bishop Paul Peter: "Would a Bank Charge Jesus Usury?" (The Social Edge June 2003).

Coincidentally, I had read the following article by David Palm: "The Red Herring of Usury" (Vol. 8, No. 9 Sept. 1997) this past week, which I found to be a very useful clarification of the Church's condemnation of usury and what practices themselves constitute usury. (Apparently there's a catch to this, for on one hand it is apparent that the Church has revised its teaching on this issue in light of the changing world of economics; on the other hand, liberal Christians/Catholics -- like Fr. Richard McBrien, citing an article by John Noonan ("Authority, Usury & Contraception" Cross Currents Winter 1996) -- contend that if the Church has changed on this practice, it can very well change on other issues: contraception, for instance (always a favorite theme of the progressives).

According to David, "Noonan is correct that the Church consistently condemned usury in the most official way." Palm cites Canon 13 of the Second Lateran Council (1139); Canon 25 of the Third Lateran Council (1179), backed by the witness of many popes, including Alexander III, Gregory IX, Urban III, Innocent III, and Clement V. Says Palm:

The teaching of the Church condemning usury is unambiguous, binding, and irrevocable. . . . There have been so many solemn decrees on the matter that to argue, as some have, that the technicalities of an infallible teaching have not been met, or that the prohibitions against usury are only disciplinary and not doctrinal, is an exercise in special pleading.

But this is not the end of the story. Noonan, says Palm, make the erroneous claim that usury is the taking of any interest on any sort of loan. But this is clearly not the case, as "The Holy See admits practically the lawfulness of interest on loans, even for ecclesiastical property" (Catholic Enyclopedia). As David Palm demonstrates, the Church has in all times rightly condemned the practice of usury; however, what constitutes usury has not always been the same:

. . . during the greater portion of antiquity, economies were characterized by a lack of competitive markets and thus few opportunities for investment. Money itself was considered primarily a medium of private and not commercial exchange. . . .

During the Scholastic period of the Middle Ages, many issues, including the question of the morality of interest-taking, were subjected to more detailed analysis. On what specific principles is interest-taking moral or immoral? This was at the heart of the question of usury. Eventually the morality of interest-taking came to be understood as intrinsically bound up in the nature of the thing lent and the impact (or lack thereof) on the person lending it. It is immoral to take interest on the loan of a thing that is completely consumed by its use, for which one has no other use, and for which one incurs no loss by lending it.

The New Catholic Encyclopedia elaborates on the technical definition of usury as it came to be used in the Middle Ages and thus in the formal conciliar texts of the Church: "From the Latin usura, usury originally meant a charge for a loan of a fungible, i.e., perishable, nonspecific good, whose use consisted of its consumption. Such a loan was called a mutuum. Money, considered to be ‘consumed’ in the process of exchange for other goods, was classified as a fungible good. And as a money loan became the most common form of loan of this type, usury came to signify a charge for the use of money. Only after repeal of the laws prohibiting interest (usury in the above sense) and the establishment of legal rates did usury assume its present meaning of a charge for a money loan that is exorbitant or exceeds the legal rate."

In the Middle Ages, Palm explains, money was considered "barren," since one could do but two things with it: spend ("consume") it, or hoard it. The lending of money was considered usurious for this reason: "Apart from risk of non-repayment, to take interest for money that you had no use for but to hoard was getting ‘a breed of barren metal.’ It was taking up what you laid not down; it was making profit out of your neighbor’s need, or your neighbor’s gain, where there was no corresponding need unsatisfied, or gain forfeited, on your part" (Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, 261).

Palm goes on to explain how, as the nature of money progressed over time, so did the criteria for usury:

. . . as civilization progressed, it became clear that money in more modern economies—with competitive markets and almost unlimited opportunities for profitable ("fruitful") investment—did not suffer from the same tendency to be "unfruitful" as it had before. In the face of this change, the Church defined what is meant by usury. Session X of the Fifth Lateran Council (1515) gave its exact meaning: "For that is the real meaning of usury: when, from its use, a thing which produces nothing is applied to the acquiring of gain and profit without any work, any expense or any risk."

So too, Pope Benedict XIV, in his encyclical Vix Pervenit, says: "The nature of the sin called usury has its proper place and origin in a loan contract [mutuum]. This financial contract between consenting parties demands, by its very nature, that one return to another only as much as he has received. The sin rests on the fact that sometimes the creditor desires more than he has given. Therefore he contends some gain is owed him beyond that which he loaned, but any gain which exceeds the amount he gave is illicit and usurious."

Note again that a mutuum is "a loan of a fungible, i.e., perishable, nonspecific good, whose use consisted of its consumption" (New Catholic Encyclopedia). But at present the choice for one’s money in our world-economy is never simply between spending and hoarding, for money can always been invested in any number of genuinely profitable ("fruitful") enterprises. There is much greater facility nowadays for making profitable investments of savings, and a true value, therefore, is always attached to the possession of money, as also to credit itself. "A lender, during the whole time that the loan continues, deprives himself of a valuable thing, for the price of which he is compensated by the interest. It is right at the present day to permit interest (which is different from usury) on money lent, as it was not wrong to condemn the practice at a time when it was more difficult to find profitable investments for money." (Catholic Enyclopedia, 1917)

Money is no longer a barren thing in itself, and thus the loan of money at interest is not usurious. Rickaby sums up the correct view of usury nicely: "[I]t is usury to take any interest at all upon the loan of a piece of property, which (a) is of no use except to be used up, spent, consumed; (b) is not wanted for the lender’s own consumption within the period of the load; (c) is lent upon security that obviates risk; (d) is so lent that the lender forgoes no occasion of lawful gain by lending it" (Rickaby, 258).

In addressing the issue of usury it seems to me that one cannot simply quote Aquinas' teaching on the topic (as one commentator has done already), or "proof-text" from this or that council or papal enyclical, but should rather consider the breadth and depth of Catholic tradition and the changing historical circumstances. As the original Catholic Enyclopedia (1917) states:

Everyone admits that a duty of charity may command us to lend gratuitously, just as it commands us to give freely. The point in question is one of justice: Is it contrary to the equity required in mutual contracts to ask from the borrower interest in addition to the money lent? It may be remarked that the best authors have long since recognized the lawfulness of interest to compensate a lender for the risk of losing his capital, or for positive loss, such as the privation of the profit which he might otherwise have made, if he had not advanced the loan. They also admit that the lender is justified in exacting a fine of some kind (a conventional penalty) in case of any delay in payment arising from the fault of the borrower. These are what are called extrinsic grounds, admitted without dispute since the end of the sixteenth century, and justifying the stipulation for reasonable interest, proportionate to the risk involved in the loan. . . .

The precise question then is this: if we consider justice only, without reference to extrinsic circumstances, can the loan of money, or any chattel which is not destroyed by use, entitle the lender to a gain or profit which is called interest? To this question some persons, namely the economists of the classic school, and some Catholic writers, answer "yes, and always"; others, namely Socialists and some Catholic writers, answer, "no, never"; and lastly some Catholics give a less unconditional answer, "sometimes, but not always"; and they explain the different attitudes of he Church in condemning at one time, and at another authorizing, the practice of taking interest on loans, by the difference of circumstances and the state of society. . . .

Finally, I wish to clarify that to recognize the proper meaning of usury should not be construed as a criticism of Orthodox Bishop Paul Peter, who I believe rightly criticizes the usury of some credit card companies charging exhorbitant loans.

Related Links

• God, Man, and Money, or How to Succeed in Business Without Going to Hell, by Michael Novak. Ignatius Insight - Originally appeared in Catholic Dossier May / June 1999. Novak provides an interesting history of the evolution of money and its value over the course of time.
• The Secret History of the Credit Card PBS Frontline Investigation.
• Usury by A. Vermeersch. Transcribed by Brendan Byrne. Catholic Enyclopedia 1917. [NewAdvent.org].
• Response To John T. Noonan, Jr. Concerning The Development Of Catholic Moral Doctrine by Patrick O'Neill. Faith & Reason Spring / Summer 1996.

The Church & Democracy: from "hostility" to "internal critique"

The Church's encounter with democracy, from the days of Gregory XVI and Pius IX to the present, can be described as a process of transition from hostility (Gregory XVI and Pius IX) to toleration (Leo XIII and Pius XI) to admiration (Pius XII and John XXIII) to endorsement (Vatican II and John Paul II), and now, in the late 1990's, to internal critique. Prior to the Council, the Church was speaking to democracy from "outside"; since the council, the Church has, in a sense, spoken to democracy from within the democratic experiment as a full participant in democratic life, commited, through its own social doctrine, to the success of the democratic project.

To describe the relationship in these terms is by no means to subordinate the Church to politics; it is to note, however, that as the Church's understanding of democracy has evolved, so has the Church's understanding of itself vis-a-vis democracy. Because of the teaching of the Council and John Paul II, an "exterior" line of critique has given way to an "interior" critique. Far from being a neutral observer, and without compromising its distinctive social and political "location," the Church now believes that it speaks to democracy from "within" the ongoing democratic debate about the democratic prospect.

John Paul II developed this "internal line" of analysis -- which now constitutes the world's most sophisticated moral case for, and critique of, the democratic project -- in a triptych of encyclicals: Centesimus Annus (1991), Veritatis Splendour (1993) and Evangelium Vitate (1995).

* * *

If a single sentence could sum up the main thrust of this new "internal critique" of democracy in the social magisterium of John Paul II, it might be this: Culture is "prior" to politics and economics. In this sense, John Paul II is a "postmodern" pope. Since Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, he has become markedly less interested in the old structural questions of politics and economics (democracy vs. ancien regime vs. totalitarianism, capitalism vs. socialism vs. the "Catholic third way"). Those questions, the Pope seems to suggest, have been largely answered. If, under the conditions of modernity, you want a free and prosperous society that protects basic human rights while advancing the common good, you choose democracy and the market (or, in the Pope's preferred phrase, the "free economy"). The really interesting and urgent questions today have to do with culture: with the habits of the heart and mind that make democracy and market work to promote genuine human goods.

George Weigel, Soul of the World: Notes on the Future of Public Catholicism (Eerdmans, 1996). p. 120. (Chapter 6: "Catholicism and Democracy: Parsing the Twentieth-Century Revolution" pp. 99-125 charts in greater detail the development of the Church's relationship and critique of liberal democracy described above. Regretfully it is not available online).

On "The Preferential Option for the Poor"

Catholics who are the least bit aquainted with the social doctrine of the Church have encountered the term "preferential option for the poor." According to Charles Curran, the phrase has its origins in the "liberation theology" espoused by radical Catholic theologians in Latin America (excerpt from Catholic Social Teaching Georgetown UP, 2002).

In an article for the U.S. Catholic (Why the preferential option for the poor is not optional, November 1997), Jack Jezreel chronicles the use of the phrase from a 1979 pastoral document by the Latin American Bishops, to the 1986 statement "Economic Justice for All", revisited in 1994's "Communities of Salt and Light", as well as pontificate of Pope John Paul II.

[Update 6/19/05 -- According to one reader, the phrase "first appeared in official episcopal documents in the SECOND Latin American Episcopal Conference, that of Medellin, in 1968 -- the Liberation Theology movement in many ways grew out of this meeting. It is in the last pages of the Medellin documents, under the heading "Preferencia y Solidaridad"." Thanks!]

Pope John Paul II spoke of this preferential option on many occasions, preferring the term "preferential love for the poor" -- the website The Social Agenda, a collection of Magisterial texts compiled by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, from which we offer two excerpts that convey a sense of this "preferential option":

It will not be superfluous therefore to reexamine and further clarify in this light the characteristic themes and guidelines dealt with by the Magisterium in the recent years. Here I would like to indicate one of them: the preferential option or love of preference for the poor. This is an option, a special form of primacy in the exercise of Christian charity, to which the whole tradition of the Church bears witness. It affects the life of each Christian inasmuch as he or she seeks to imitate the life of Christ, but it applies equally to our social responsibilities and hence to our manner of living, and to the logical decisions to be made concerning our ownership and the use of goods. (Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, n. 42)

In seeking to promote human dignity, the Church shows a preferential love of the poor and voiceless, because the Lord has identified himself with them in special way (cf. Mt 25:40). This love excludes no one, but simply embodies a priority of service to which the whole Christian tradition bears witness. This love of preference for the poor, and the decisions which it inspires in us, cannot but embrace the immense multitudes of the hungry, the needy, the homeless, those without medical care and, above all, those without hope of a better future. (Ecclesia in Asia, n. 34)

It should not suprise us that the phrase itself is subject to a wide variety of interpretations, often reflecting the political and spiritual orientation of the individual.

For instance, operating in the spirit of St. Francis, the Catholic Worker movement advocates the adoption of voluntary poverty. According to the Catholic Worker "Manifesto" Aims and Means:

"The mystery of poverty is that by sharing in it, making ourselves poor in giving to others, we increase our knowledge and belief in love." (Dorothy Day) By embracing voluntary poverty, that is, by casting our lot freely with those whose impoverishment is not a choice, we would ask for the grace to abandon ourselves to the love of God. It would put us on the path to incarnate the Church's "preferential option for the poor."

In his thoughtful post Blessed Are They The Poor in Spirit: A Catholic View of Economics (Cooperatores Veritatis June 7, 2003) Greg Mockeridge contends that the "preferential option" entails the necessary inclusion of those in need, helping the poor to better themselves, to improve their economic conditions by putting their creativity to use in the workplace and becoming financially self-sufficient:

The genius in the cultivation of resources and economic success finds its fulfillment in the preferential option for the poor. A society whose economic activity is exclusive to anyone because of race or social class cannot truthfully claim economic prosperity despite superficial appearances of it. In ignoring the poor, society not only fails in its duty to help those in need, but also deprives itself of the beneficial contribution of ingenuity that is gained by those who, through their circumstances, have discovered ways to make astoundingly productive use from the most meager resources. Growing up in a large blue-collar family myself, I know first hand how to make abundances from the scantiest of means. This sort of ingenuity has been the hallmark of American economic prosperity. We have seen immigrants come to this country with nothing more than faith in God and gratitude for their freedom build economic empires. The preferential option for the poor is not a political play toy exploiting the needy by creating an unhealthy dependence on government programs nor is it "...exclusive or discriminatory toward other groups", (Centesimus Annus n 57), but a recognition that the economic chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

In Reforming Our Attitudes (Religion & Liberty September / October 1995), Fr. Robert Sirico, President of the Acton Institute, discusses how we can practice Christian charity in ways which recognize the innate human dignity of the poor:

First, we can no longer believe that the call of compassion is satisfied by simply writing a check. The poor are asking for much more than our money. We must begin to make the more difficult sacrifices of our time, energy and talents. We must go to the poor where they live and enter into their poverty in order to help them rise above it. In our efforts to help those suffering the effects of poverty, dollars may be the least important consideration.

Another attitude that must change is our tendency to believe that as individuals we cannot make a meaningful contribution. When faced with a homeless person, the temptation is to think “What could I, with my limited experience and resources, do?” We therefore turn to simply giving money. We need to rethink this response and consider other ways we can contribute; perhaps volunteering at a private shelter, or maybe starting a shelter where there is none, or even having a conversation with a homeless person, as a person, and ask them what they truly need. This is the more radical approach because it requires that we listen to the poor and allow them to become part of the solution — not just the target of our pity.

A third attitude we must adopt is that we no longer view the poor as incapable. One of the most egregious faults of current government programs is the hidden assumption that the poor will always remain poor. While admitting that some people suffer from more than the effects of poverty which prevent them from becoming productive members of society, many of those receiving government assistance can contribute to the elevation of their standard of living. The poor themselves have to be a part of the solution to their own problems. Requiring some level of participation and responsibility on the part of individuals will offer the opportunity for more than dollars or a job, it will offer the opportunity for self-esteem.

Fr. Sirico's approach strikes me as being suprisingly close to Dorothy Day's -- at least in spirit, if not in policy. Browse through her extensive writings and you'll encounter a strong believer in personal responsibility and self-empowerment, highly critical of state-sanctioned welfare and handouts which leave the poor in a state of dependency.

Contrary to the Catholic Workers of today who indulge in either general dismissals or denunciations of "the neocons", I believe Ms. Day would have the desire and the capacity to truly listen to somebody like Fr. Sirico, or Michael Novak for that matter. They may not see eye to eye on the merits of the free market, but it's likely that they would have discovered common ground in an appreciation of the personalism and social thought of Pope John Paul II.

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In his pastoral letter A Time for Honesty, addressing the scandal of "pro-choice politicians" and the argument that "the Church has many social teachings and abortion is one of them," Rev. John J. Myers, Archbishop of Newark, took a moment to clarify the Church's position on social teaching -- given the nature of this post it seems fitting to close with his words:

The Church's social teaching is a diverse and rich tradition of moral truths and biblical insights applied to the political, economic, and cultural aspects of our society. All Catholics should form and inform their conscience in accordance with these teachings. But reasonable Catholics can (and do) disagree about how to apply these teachings in various situations.

For example, our preferential option for the poor is a fundamental aspect of this teaching. But, there are legitimate disagreements about the best way or ways truly to help the poor in our society. No Catholic can legitimately say, "I do not care about the poor." If he or she did so this person would not be objectively in communion with Christ and His Church. But, both those who propose welfare increases and those who propose tax cuts to stimulate the economy may in all sincerity believe that their way is the best method really to help the poor. This is a matter of prudential judgment made by those entrusted with the care of the common good. It is a matter of conscience in the proper sense.

Related Links & Resources

The online archives of The Acton Institute offer much food for thought on how we can engage in effective compassion and assist the poor and financially impoverished. Here are just a few:

• In Human Capital and Poverty (Religion & Liberty January/February 1998), Gery Becker notes that "Human capital, e.g., the skills, education, and values of an individual, constitutes our most valuable and available resource for ameliorating poverty."

• In Effective Aid to the Poor, Dr. Digby Anderson, Director of the London-based Social Affairs Unit, addresses the two challenges which poverty-relief faces: Generosity and Efficiency:
  Giving away money is easy, provided youve got enough in the first place. But giving away money efficiently is very difficult. And that remains true whether the donor is the state, a voluntary association, or an individual. . . . The modern church rightly tells the rich to give to the poor. It presents the problem as one of lack of generosity. And so, in part, it is. But the church has little to say about how the poor are to be identified, how much each one should get, how to establish priorities among claims for charity, which forms of help are best, and how to avoid help becoming harm.

• In Poverty, Virtue, and Grace (1996 Lord Acton Essay), Fr. Robert Johansen -- yes, of the blog Thrown Back -- draws upon the thought of Lord Acton, who "held the conviction, expressed by Christian thinkers throughout history, that poverty is not a merely material problem, but a moral and spiritual problem as well."

• John Paul IIs Use of the Term Neo-Liberalism in Ecclesia in America, by Michel Therrien. Based on a paper delivered at the Pontifical College Josephinum April 8, 2000.

• Finally, Fr. Neuhaus illustrates the need for civil dialogue on such matters between Catholics in "Against Neoliberalism" (First Things 95 August/September 1999: 80-99.):
  The Zwicks essay is an extended polemic against neoconservatism, a.k.a. neoliberalism, a.k.a. capitalism. So, as might be expected, Michael Novak, George Weigel, and Father Robert Sirico come in for very unfavorable mention. The neoliberalism supported by this writer and his friends, say the editors, "mows down people who are in other countries through slave wages, international trade agreements and torture taught at the School of the Americas to ensure that ‘freedom prevails. It is very violent." But the Zwicks go beyond the usual suspects. They write, "Another well–respected priest, Fr. Avery Dulles, S.J., defends slave wages as being better than no wages." Fr. Dulles is not simply a well–respected priest, he is undoubtedly the most widely respected Catholic theologian in the United States (to whom, not incidently, Appointment in Rome is dedicated). And, if one really wanted to press the point, might one not be able to make the case that low wages, even very low wages, are better than no wages at all? But, in fact, what the Catholic Worker says is false.

  Fr. Dulles tells me that he remembers meeting the Zwicks at a meeting in Washington and, in private conversation, asked them what they thought of the argument of an acquaintance of his who does business in Latin America and claims that, although the wages he pays are low by North American standards, they are much higher than his workers could otherwise obtain. He says he does not recall how the Zwicks responded to his question, if they did. Since then, however, they have more than once published the claim that Fr. Dulles "defends slave wages" in Latin America. Such libel does nothing to enhance the legacy of Dorothy Day which the Catholic Worker supposedly champions.

  Surely, as reasonable Catholics, we can do better?

Update - A good follow-up discussion of this issue at the Catholic legal theory blog Mirror of Justice:

• Mark Sargent asks How Elastic Is the Preferential Option for the Poor? (6/20/05)

• MOJ colleague Rick Garnett counters inThe Prefential Option: A follow-up (6/21/05)

• Another lively discussion by the Commentariat at Amy Welborn. (6/22/05)

• A thought in progress @ Disputations:
  If poverty is an economic problem to be solved, then it's not my problem; I can barely handle my own economic problems, much less help others with theirs. If it's an economic debate, it's not my debate.

  And if it's an economic problem or debate, it's not really the Church's problem or debate, in any particular way. All the Church would have to do is remind everyone of the basic moral principles, then let the economists and policy makers go to town.

  But I don't think that's what the Church says. I don't think she regards poverty as a problem to be solved so much as a sorrow to be joined in. . . .

  The Gospel is not an economic development plan. The Kingdom of God is not a matter of eating or of drinking. Those of us who can speak of "the poor" rather than "we poor" must be in communion with those who can't, to share the life of the Spirit with them. Not in a patronizing way, assuring them they'll be just fine once they're dead; but in the way Christians were once known for loving each other.

Weigel's call for a revitalization of "international Catholic relations"

The May 2004 issue of First Things has an excellent article by George Weigel: "World Order: What Catholics Forgot" in which he contends that "the difficult period [between the United States and the Vatican during the Iraq war] was itself a by-product of a forty-year 'time of forgetting' -- a forgetting of the distinctive way Catholics have thought about world politics for centuries." It's a lengthy article, and worth reading in full if you have the time, but I'll attempt to summarize its key points. ¹

Weigel describes Catholic international relations theory as forged by Augustine & Aquinas, refined by s Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez in the Counter-Reformation, and further developed during the pontificates of Pius XII and John XXIII. This Catholic "tradition of moral realism" was marked by three key insights:

1. The insistence that politics is an area of rationality and moral responsibility -- precisely because politics is a human activity, and moral judgement a defining characteristic of the human person. Furthermore, says Weigel, this recognition was grounded in the Catholic theological conviction that: "mankind is not "totally depraved," as some Reformation traditions taught; that society is a natural reality; that governance has a positive, not merely punitive or coercive, function; that political community is a good in its own right, an expression of the sociability that is part of the God-given texture of the human condition."

2. The classical understanding of power as "the capacity to achieve a corporate purpose for the common good") -- that is to say, politics cannot be "reduced, or traduced, to violence"; nor is politics the antinomy of peace; rather, politics has a positive dimension, its proper exercise a form of human creativity:

   The Catholic question was never, should power be exercised? Rather, the Catholic question was, how is power to be exercised? To what ends, by what authority, through what means? Power, in this understanding, is not the antinomy of peace (which is one of the goods to be sought by public authority); power, rightly understood, is a means to the achievement of the good of peace.

3. A distinctive understanding of peace -- not the peace of the human individual achieved by a right relationship with God, nor "the eschatalogical peace of a conflict-free world," but rather the peace of political community, "in which order, law, freedom, and just structures of governance advance the common good."

Catholic international relations theory stressed international legal and political institutions as a remedy for the threat of modern war and as the natural evolution of human political development -- the highlight of which was John XXIII's 1963 encyclical Pacem in Terris. Unfortunately, charges Weigel, this distinctively Catholic "international relations theory" has not had significant influence among Catholic moral theologians and international relations specialists since the mid 1960's. This neglect of Catholic international relations theory is particularly regretful given two developments in the Church's involvement with world politics during John Paul II's pontificate which "call for a development of Catholic international relations theory -- and precisely at the level of theory.

The first development is John Paul II's insistence that human rights are the moral core of the "universal common good" and that religious freedom is the first human right to which institutions of international public life must attend. This is "a function of the Pope's teaching that all thinking about society, even international society, must begin with an adequate philosophical anthropology, which recognizes in the human quest for transcendent truth and love the defining characteristic of our humanity."

The second is "the emergence of the Papacy as a global moral witness, with real effect within and among nation-states." Weigel cites several examples, such as the Pope's role in the collapse of European communism ²; the Pope's support for democratic movements in the Phillipines and Latin American nations; and the Vatican's role in organizing effective international opposition to the Clinton Administration's efforts to have abortion-on-demand declared a fundamental human right in the 1994 Cairo World Conference on Population and Development.

Weigel sees a tension in the fact that the Pope carries his moral witness directly to the people (of individual states or the world in general), in many cases circumventing governments or relevant international organizations, while the various congregations of the Holy See continues diplomatic relations through normal channels ("of bilateral relations and multilateral institutions"). This tension was made explicit in the Church's role in the debate over the U.S. war with Iraq:

John Paul II has been a moral witness speaking truth to power in world politics; his diplomatic representatives, by definition, must be "players" according to the established rules of the game. Sometimes those roles can get confused. Some would argue that this happened during the debate prior to the recent Iraq War, when the prudential judgments of Vatican diplomats and agency heads were often reported (and perceived) as if they were decisive moral judgments by the man the world has come to recognize as its foremost moral authority -- Pope John Paul II. Then there is the question of how the Holy See, which is not a state, is to function in international fora in which every other actor of consequence is a state. How is it possible for the Holy See to function like a state without being a state and without damaging the Catholic Church's moral witness? To take one pressing issue here: Can the Holy See, without damaging the moral witness of the Catholic Church, form practical alliances for purposes of defending the family and the inalienable right to life with Muslim states whose policy and practice deny what the Catholic Church claims is the moral core of the universal common good—religious freedom?

Weigel does not believe this ambiguity and tension can be resolved -- more importantly, "nor should it be prematurely resolved in either direction (i.e., by muting the moral witness of the Office of Peter, or by the Holy See's withdrawal from bilateral and multilateral diplomacy)." In the face of utiliatarianism ("the default position in international politics"), the Church must continue to assert the dignity of the human person. In the face of militant Islamic fundamentalism, the Church must demonstrate that religion is not necessarily violent or aggressive. If this comes at a cost of ambiguity and tension, says Weigel, so be it.

That said, Weigel believes we must "reconvene a conversation that has lapsed for almost forty years", developing Catholic international relations theory to counter "realpolitik that has corrupted Western European thinking about world politics." This development must address the current realities of international public life:

• "[T]he emergence of a plethora of international legal, political, and economic institutions, and the impact of nonstate actors on world affairs" -- ranging from global financial instutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to the pervasive threat of transnational terrorist organizations and criminal cartels.

• "[T]he enduring reality of the nation-state system [which remains] the basic organizing unit of world politics"

• The failure of the UN to adequately address "the new reality of aggressive nonstate actors (including terrorist organizations) and with the often-lethal reality of what are sometimes called 'failed states' or 'collapsing states'." Here Weigel cites a litany of post-Cold War crises:

  "the Rwandan genocide, the collapse of Yugoslavia, the hijacking of Afghanistan by the Taliban, widespread famine in sub-Saharan Africa, the African AIDS pandemic, and the spread of SARS from China. Catholic international relations theory must, in other words, face squarely the moral and political failures of a UN system in which Libya can become chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission, in which Saddam Hussein's Iraq can be slated to chair a major international meeting on disarmament, in which the Security Council has become dysfunctional because its structure and procedures are incongruent with the realities it must address, and in which UN peacekeeping operations (as in Kosovo) too often serve to create new dependencies rather than functioning civil societies.

• "[T]he antidemocratic (and often anti-Catholic) bias in regional associations such as the European Union" -- which Weigel touched on in a previous article "Europe's Problem, And Ours" (First Things 140 (February 2004): 18-25)

• "A new and dangerous form of judicial activism in international legal institutions", in which "international courts or national courts claiming international jurisdiction have imitated activist U.S. appellate courts and have become vigorous contestants in an international culture war over such issues as the family, abortion, and human sexuality"

Reading these "signs of the times," Weigel concludes by presenting four priorities for the intellectual development of Catholic international relations theory:

1. Catholic international relations theory must take into account the relationship between "hard power" and "soft power," and between the rule of law and the use of armed force, in international public life.

   Refering to the terminology of Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye, Weigel calls for better familiarization with the relationship of "hard power" and "soft power,"in the pursuit of an ordered peace, composed of freedom, justice and security. The effective deployment of "soft power", or nonviolent tactics of persuasion, requires a certain historical context. Its application cannot universalized as a matter of policy. (Ex. "Had the nascent state of Israel opted for a "soft power" approach to being invaded by several Arab states in 1948, the Jews would have been driven into the sea in a mass slaughter.)

   Likewise, says Weigel, we must recognize that "law is not self-vindicating or self-enforcing":

   To juxtapose an undefined "law of force" over against the "force of law" in an absolute antinomy seems unsatisfactory, empirically and morally. All law, of whatever sort, ultimately requires the sanction of enforcement if "law" is to mean anything other than a vague expression of good intentions. This is a perennial feature of the human condition."

   Given the human tendency to "breach the peace," even a world of just and democratically-accountable international institutions as envisioned by John XXIII in Pacem in Terris would have to be backed by proportionate and discriminate armed force. ³

2. The rediscovery of the classical Catholic view of the morally legitimate deployment of armed force -- Contemporary international law and recent Catholic commentary (including the Vatican) have settled on the view that first use of armed force is always bad (a "presumption against violence"), which both Weigel and just war scholar James Turner Johnson has questioned as contrary to the classical Catholic view. ⁴

   According to Weigel: "twenty-first-century Catholic international relations theory is going to have to think about these various uses of armed force in a more nuanced way. This, in turn, requires refining our understanding of 'aggression' and refining the criteria by which the international community and individual states can judge, with moral legitimacy, that aggression is 'underway.'" Case in point:

   During the Iraq War, the president of the American Society of International Law suggested that aggression could reasonably be said to be underway when three conditions had been met: when a state possessed weapons of mass destruction or exhibited clear and convincing evidence of intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction; when grave and systematic human rights abuses in the state in question demonstrated the absence of internal constraints on that state's international behavior; and when the state in question had demonstrated aggressive intent against others in the past. The author suggested that these three criteria set a high threshold for the first use of armed force in the face of aggression, while recognizing that there are risks too great to be countenanced by responsible statesmen. A revitalized Catholic international relations theory would engage this proposal, help to refine it, and indeed open a broader discussion that would include filling in the criteria by which the duty of humanitarian intervention is satisfied by the use of armed force when other remedies fail.

3. A critical evaluation of ontemporary international organizations [such as the United Nations] and their contribution to "the peace of order and to the freedom, justice, and security that are its component parts." The Vatican's intensifying support for the UN has been questioned by Weigel and others in light of the UN's adoption of policies on abortion, family, and the proper response to the AIDS pandemic which run contrary to Catholic moral teaching. With respect to the war in Iraq, Weigel criticizes statements by Vatican officials which imply that the only justifiable use of force is that which is formally sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council:

   What is striking about recent commentary from officials of the Holy See on the Security Council's monopoly of legitimating authority in the matter of using armed force is that it has been asserted, not argued. The sheer fact of the UN system seems to be taken to constitute a new moral reality; states which adhere to the UN Charter are deemed to have forfeited attributes of their sovereignty that the Catholic Church had long recognized as morally legitimate. Perhaps that is the case. But that case has to be made, not assumed. And in arguing the case, certain facts of international public life cannot be denied.

   Weigel elaborates, challenging whether the "international community" has bound itself to the U.N.'s charter and rules concerning the use of force ("Since 1945, 126 out of 189 UN member states have been involved in 291 armed conflicts in which some twenty-two million people have been killed") and why he is reluctant to yield moral authority to the Security Council ("How, for example, is moral legitimacy conferred by the Security Council when three of its permanent members—China, France, and Russia—formulate their foreign policies on explicitly realpolitik grounds that have little or nothing to do with moral reasoning about world politics as the Catholic Church understands it?").

   No other global institution is as likely to bring the skills of moral reasoning to bear on the task of international organizational reform as the Catholic Church," says Weigel. It would be a tragic lost if the Church were to forsake its potential by granting an "undifferentiated embrace" of the United Nations as it is today.

4. A thorough reexamination of the just war tradition. Given the Church's vocal opposition to the Gulf War and the deposition of Saddam Hussein by the U.S., Weigel again raises the question of whether the Catholic Church's current position on armed force is tatamount to "functional pacifism" -- "a way of thinking that retains the intellectual apparatus of the just war tradition of moral reasoning but that always comes down, at the bottom line, in opposition to the use of armed force." ⁵ As Weigel observes, various statements by the Holy Father and members of the Vatican Curia can be marshalled for or against this interpretation, calling for greater clarification of where the Church stands with respect to armed force.

   Several of the "priority issues" I have been discussing here bear on the reexamination of just war thinking for the post-Cold War world: the question of what constitutes "aggression underway" (which bears on the classic just war criteria of "just cause" and "last resort"); the moral status of the UN system (which touches the just war criterion of "proper authority"). Another reality of the contemporary world with which a reexamined and refined just war tradition would have to wrestle is the fact that precision-guided munitions and other forms of high-tech weaponry now make it more likely that a responsible country can use military force in ways that satisfy the in bello just war criteria of no-more-force-than-necessary and noncombatant immunity. Refining Catholic thinking on these questions is essential to the revitalization of Catholic international relations theory.

   It is with some amusement that I read that Weigel's article is an adaptation of "the twenty-sixth annual Thomas Merton Lecture delivered at Columbia University," given Thomas Merton's own pacifistic leanings and vehement denunciation of the U.S. military. At any rate, Weigel's article is a good condensation of his earlier works, and makes a good case for what the Church has to offer to the world; let us hope his call for the "revitalization of Catholic international relations theory" will not go unheeded.

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1. Given it's comprehensive subject matter, this summary is cross-posted to both my "Catholic Just War" and "Religion & Liberty" blogs.

2. As chronicled in Weigel's book The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism

3. See "Force of law, law of force ". The Catholic Difference. Publication Date: April 30, 2003

4. See "Moral Clarity in Time of War", First Things 128 (January 2003): 20-2; "Using Military Force Against the Saddam Hussein Regime: the Moral Issues", James Turner Johnson. Foreign Policy Research Institute December 4, 2002. I previously blogged on Weigel and Johnson's questioning of the "presumption against war" on Dec. 6, 2003.

5. See my post "Pacifism and the end of the Just War Tradition", Nov. 30, 2003.