Debating the Separation of Religion and Politics, by Fr. Richard J. Neuhaus. "On The Square" First Things November 15, 2007. Excerpts from an opening statement at a debate sponsored by The Economist on the resolution: "Religion and politics should always be kept separate" with Barry Lynn of Americans United for the Separation of Church and State:

It is not true that our society is divided between a moral majority of the religious, on the one hand, and an immoral or amoral minority of the nonreligious, on the other. Atheists can have moral convictions that are every bit as strong as the moral convictions of the devout Christian or observant Jew. What we have in the political arena is not a division between the moral and the immoral but an ongoing contention between different moral visions addressing the political question—how ought we to order our life together?

This ongoing contention, this experience of being locked in civil argument, is nothing less than democracy in action. It is Lincoln and Douglas debating the morality of slavery; it is the argument about whether unborn children have rights we are obliged to respect; it is the argument over whether the war in Iraq is just or unjust. And on and on. These are all moral arguments to which people bring their best moral judgment. In short, our political system calls for open-ended argument about all the great issues that touch upon the question “How ought we to order our life together?”

The idea that some citizens should be excluded from addressing that question because their arguments are religious, or that others should be excluded because their arguments are nonreligious or antireligious, is an idea deeply alien to the representative democracy that this constitutional order is designed to protect. A foundational principle of that order is that all citizens have equal standing in the public square. [...]

As I have suggested, religion cannot be separated from politics. More precisely, religion cannot be separated from democratic politics. But I do believe that religious leaders should be more circumspect and restrained than they sometimes are in addressing political issues, and that for two reasons. The first and most important reason is that the dynamics of political battle tend to corrupt religion, blurring the distinctions between the temporal and the eternal, the sacred and the profane. So the first concern is for the integrity of religion.

The second concern is for the integrity of politics. Making distinctively religious arguments in political debates tends to be both ineffective and unnecessarily polarizing. Citizens who are religious, like all citizens, should as much as possible make arguments on the basis of public reasons that are accessible to everyone. [...]

There is a long and complicated history by which the West, and America in particular, has arrived at our commitment to freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of political action. These freedoms, as they are enshrined in the First Amendment, are all of a piece. Our history and our commitment is not shared by everyone in the world. In most dramatic contrast today are Islamic societies in which, as many see it, the brutal choice is posed between monolithic religion or monolithic secularism. We have to hope that is not the case, but that is a problem for Muslims to resolve.

Thank God, and thank the American Founders, our circumstance is very different. Ours is a pluralistic society in which, by the means of representative democracy, all citizens—whether religious, nonreligious, antireligious, or undecided—are on an equal footing as they bring their diverse and sometimes conflicting moral visions to bear on the great question of politics—how ought we to order our life together?

Bishop Richard J. Neuhaus

From First Things Blog:

Some Muslims in America are unhappy with us. And apparently they know something I don’t. This from The American Muslim:

“The most extreme and most sophisticated example of patronizing intolerance in contemporary America, because it most starkly illustrates the reversal of truth and falsehood, was Michael Novak’s seminal article in the April 2003 issue of America’s leading journal on religion in public life, First Things. Its founder, Bishop Richard John Neuhaus, a convert from Lutheranism to Catholicism, changed the environment in Washington by his enormously influential book, The Naked Public Square. This journal and its elite pundits are today the world’s most influential force in shaping policy toward the role of religion, including Islam.”

I’m waiting to hear from the Vatican on my elevation to the episcopate.

Nice joke, although I can imagine a few Catholics who would be absolutely horrified by the ecclesial appointment of a neocon. ;-)

Damon Linker v. Fr. Neuhaus - Response & Commentary

See also our compilation of reviews and discussion on Fr. Neuhaus' Catholic Matters: Confusion, Controversy, and the Splendor of Truth (Basic Books. March 2006)]

• "The Christianizing of America" - Without a Doubt, by Damon Linker. The New Republic March 24, 2006.
• Response: The Dangerous Neuhaus, by James M. Kushiner. Mere Commments March 24, 2006.
• Response: TNR on Fr. Neuhaus, by Rick Garnett. Mirror of Justice March 25, 2006.
• Discussion of Fr. Neuhaus, Damon Linker, et al. @ Amy Welborn's Open Book March 29, 2006.
• Joining the Conversation The American Scene March 30, 2006.
• American Theocrat, by John Wilson. Christianity Today May / June 2006.
• $160,000! - Rod Dreher muses on Damon Linker's hatchet job on Fr. Neuhaus. The number refers to the advance given to him by his publishers, as relayed by Fr. Neuhaus in the latest First Things "Public Square":

  A few weeks later, [Damon] told me he was thinking of writing a book about First Things and its editor in chief. He explained that the book would be a critical appreciation of the achievements of the magazine. I said I would be happy to cooperate with such a project but I didn't think there would be enough interest in the subject to elicit a large advance from a publisher. Moreover, this would be a first book by a relatively unknown writer. In early December, he told me that several publishers had indicated intense interest in the book he was proposing and that Doubleday had offered an advance of $160,000. He wanted to leave at the beginning of 2005 to start writing. Surprised but pleased by his good fortune, I congratulated him and renewed my offer to be of assistance wtih the book. I then said it might be helpful in that connection if I could see the proposal he had submitted to publishers. At this he blanched and, with obvious embarrassment, said that would not be possible. This was the first indication that he had agreed to write what in the publishing business is knowns as an "attack book," which, unfortunately, is the genre to which "The Theocons" belongs.

• Theocracy, Theocracy, Theocracy, by Ross Douthat. First Things 165 (August/September 2006): 23-30. A review of American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century, by Kevin Phillips; The Baptizing of America: The Religious Right’s Plans for the Rest of Us, by James Rudin; Kingdom Coming: The Rise of Christian Nationalism, by Michelle Goldberg, and Thy Kingdom Come: How The Religious Right Distorts the Faith and Threatens America: An Evangelical’s Lament by Randall Balmer:

  This is a paranoid moment in American politics. A host of conspiracies haunt our national imagination, and apparent incompetence is assumed to be the consequence of a dark design: President Bush knew about the attacks of September 11 in advance, or else the Israelis did; the Straussians took us to war in Iraq, unless the oil companies did; the federal government let the levees break in New Orleans, unless it dynamited them itself.

  Perhaps the strangest of these strange stories, though, is the notion that twenty-first-century America is slouching toward theocracy. . . .

Fr. Neuhaus: Catholic Matters: Confusion, Controversy, and the Splendor of Truth

Catholic Matters: Confusion, Controversy, and the Splendor of Truth, by Richard J. Neuhaus. (Basic Books. March 2006)

Book Reviews & Blog Discussions

• Review: Catholic Matters, by Patrick Allitt The New York Times April 14, 2006.
• Why Catholic Matters, by Al Kimel. Pontifications April 4, 2006.
• "The Story of the World", by Oswald Sobrino. Catholic Analysis March 31, 2006.
• The Literary Counter-Reformation, by Mark Gauvreau Judge. The American Spectator February 28, 2006.

The Jeffrey Hart Debate - American Conservatism at a Crossroads?

Jeffrey Hart is an English professor at Dartmouth College. A speechwriter for President Ronald Reagan and an editor of the National Review (the longest serving NR editor after William F. Buckley), Hart is author of The Making of the American Conservative Mind: National Review and Its Times, the authorized history of the National Review and the forthcoming "The American Conservative Mind Today."

On December 25, 2005, the Wall Street Journal published the final chapter of The American Conservative Mind Today, titled The Burke Habit: Prudence, skepticism and "unbought grace".

Hart presents an "assessment of the ideas held in balance in the American Conservative Mind today," -- "a synthesis . . . based on what American conservatism has achieved and left unachieved since [Russel Kirk's The Conservative Mind (1953)].

The synthesis, according to Hart, consists of a number of elements: resistance to "hard utopianism" (ex. communism's attempt to fashion "The Perfect Man and Perfect Society") and "soft utopianism" ("benevolent illusions, most abstractly stated in the proposition that all goals are reconcilable" -- ex. World Peace, multiculturalism, pacifism and Wilsonian global democracy); the validity of the nation state and the merits of constitutional government (aiming at government "not by majorities alone but by stable consensus," together with "mutual restraint among the branches").

Hart includes the advocacy of free market economics in his consensus, established by virtue of its supremacy over socialism. At the same time, however, he adds a word of caution:

the utopian temptation can turn such free-market thought into a utopianism of its own -- that is, free markets to be effected even while excluding every other value and purpose . . .

Hart mourns the neglect of Beauty ("Beauty has been clamorously present in the American Conservative Mind through its almost total absence") and the GOP's lack of concern for proper stewardship of the environment ("embarassingly . . . left mostly to liberal Democrats"), or, with regard to the role of religion, calling for "a recovery of the great structure of metaphysics, with the Resurrection as its fulcrum, established as history, and interpreted through Greek philosophy."

Hart also rails against the "Hard Wilsonianism" of the Republican Party, fueled by President Bush's desire to secure peace through the establishment of democracy:

No one has ever thought Wilsonianism to be conservative, ignoring as it does the intractability of culture and people's high valuation of a modus vivendi. Wilsonianism derives from Locke and Rousseau in their belief in the fundamental goodness of mankind and hence in a convergence of interests.

George W. Bush has firmly situated himself in this tradition, as in his 2003 pronouncement, "The human heart desires the same good things everywhere on earth." Welcome to Iraq. Whereas realism counsels great prudence in complex cultural situations, Wilsonianism rushes optimistically ahead.

The faux-"conservativism" of the GOP, says Hart, serves as "an example of Machiavelli's observation that institutions can retain the same outward name and aspect while transforming their substance entirely."

Hart's editorial strikes all the right notes (indeed, much of what he says has a certain affinity to Rod Dreher's crunchy-conservatism). I imagine his critique would likely warm the hearts of a few of our friends . . . if not for the fact that Hart's criticism of the Republicans extends to their defense of the "right to life":

[Abortion] has been a focus of conservative, and national, attention since Roe v. Wade. Yet abortion as an issue, its availability indeed as a widespread demand, did not arrive from nowhere. Burke had a sense of the great power and complexity of forces driving important social processes and changes. Nevertheless, most conservatives defend the "right to life," even of a single-cell embryo, and call for a total ban on abortion. To put it flatly, this is not going to happen. Too many powerful social forces are aligned against it, and it is therefore a utopian notion.

Roe relocated decision-making about abortion from state governments to the individual woman, and was thus a libertarian, not a liberal, ruling. Planned Parenthood v. Casey supported Roe, but gave it a social dimension, making the woman's choice a derivative of the women's revolution. This has been the result of many accumulating social facts, and its results already have been largely assimilated. Roe reflected, and reflects, a relentlessly changing social actuality. Simply to pull an abstract "right to life" out of the Declaration of Independence is not conservative but Jacobinical. To be sure, the Roe decision was certainly an example of judicial overreach. Combined with Casey, however, it did address the reality of the American social process.

* * *

Needless to say, there have been a number of responses to Jeffrey Hart's editorial:

• Jeffrey Hart on 'the conservative mind' The New Criterion: "Armavirumque" Dec. 27, 2005. James Panero provides some background on Hart and posts a link to an essay, Lessons from Jeffrey Hart, "on the Hart School [of Conservatism] and its influence on young staffers in the Reagan administration."

• The American Mind Today, by Stephen Bainbridge. Dec. 27, 2005. Prof. Bainbridge has the interesting observation that "what Hart doesn't discuss here is the possibility that the United States is not a nation-state but rather a state-nation."

• Jeffrey Hart on 'the conservative mind': the response The New Criterion: "Armavirumque" Dec. 28, 2005. James Panero rounds up responses to Hart's article from National Review's blog "The Corner" by Peter Robinson, Jonah Goldberg and Ramesh Ponnuru (start here and scroll up). While agreeing that "Hart is always worth reading," both Goldberg and Ponnuru find fault with Hart's curious take on abortion.

• Also weighing in by email to the NRO is Fr. Gerry Murray , of New York city's St. Vincent de Paul parish and a former alumni of Dartmouth. Responding to Hart's criticism that "Simply to pull an abstract 'right to life' out of the Declaration of Independence is not conservative but Jacobinical," Murray counters

  There is nothing abstract about an unborn human being, and likewise the metaphysical laws that govern human life are not abstractions, but rather the solid ground that makes a just society possible. My right not to be killed, without justification, at the discretion of another person is no an abstraction, it is the fundamental condition of the existence of any justly ordered community of persons. What is an abstraction is Roe, in which unborn human are not persons, and the killing of such non-persons is legally sanctioned and protected by the state against any interference.

  Babies before birth are people, and to treat them in any other way requires entrance into the horrible world of evil ideas (lies) that result in evil (unjust) actions. The Roe justices that gave us abortion would have liked the country to march into that world with them; they have been and will be unsuccessful as long as we do not concede the fight.

  Fr. Murray's letter is reproduced in full here, together with a response Jeffrey Hart's response (New Criterion: "Armavirumque" Dec. 29, 2005).

  Resonding to Fr. Murray, Hart takes a cheap shot at Fr. Neuhaus and First Things critique of "judicial activism" (as documented in The End of Democracy Spence Publishing Company, 1997):

  Some years ago, as I recall, Father Richard Neuhaus asserted in his magazine First Things that because of legal abortion the United States "regime" is illegitimate. That's right, "illegitimate." Of course this easy chair insurrectionary, this Jacobinical priest, did not become a genuine insurrectionary such as John Brown. Neuhaus knew only too well that the real insurrectionary John Brown received justice at the end of a rope. Neuhaus did not even go to prison, for, say, refusing to pay taxes. Thoreau had gone to prison over the Mexican war.

  
• Hart's comments drew a response from Fr. Neuhaus (First Things: On The Square, Dec. 30, 2005):

  Oh dear. “Easy chair insurrectionary,” “Jacobinical priest.” And here I always thought of Jeffrey as a friend. At least he has always been very cordial when we met in the company of friends. . . .

  What was thought to be a radical idea at the time–and what Jeffrey Hart apparently still thinks is an impermissibly radical idea–is that we could reach a point, if the judicial usurpation of politics continued unabated, at which the American political order would be morally illegitimate and democratic government effectively ended.

  To deny the possibility that the American polity could descend into a form of tyranny, in this case judicial tyranny, is, I believe, a form of national hubris, and precludes the possibility of any rational consideration of what is meant by the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate government.

• (The New Criterion "Armavirumque" Dec. 30, 2005). Ryan M. Schwarz thinks that: "As a longtime admirer of both Hart and Neuhaus (and, in the spirit of full disclosure, a former parishioner of Neuhaus' in his Lutheran days), I've quite enjoyed reading this little dustup . . . It does appear, however, that the participants are talking past each other just a bit."

• Hart responded yet again to Neuhaus, protesting that, with respect to abortion, he was conducting Analysis, not Advocacy (New Criterion: "Armavirumque" Dec. 31, 2005): "The demand [for a "right" to abortion] will probably increase as a result of the successful women's revolution. Again, that was analytical. No one has challenged that analysis." Hart also disputed Neuhaus' rendition of events:

  Richard Neuhaus understates what actually happened in his magazine First Things in 1999. First Things ran five (commissioned) articles under the overall heading "The End of Democracy?" (He now says that some people thought the question mark unjustified -- that is, they thought democracy in fact had ended with Roe vs. Wade!

  Walter Berns and Gertrude Himmelfarb removed their names from the masthead of First Things. Mr. Berns protested that the magazine was "close to advocating not only civil disobedience but armed revolution."

  The spirit of Che Guevara must have been near at hand.

  Robert Bork objected to Neuhaus's observation that we "have reached the point where conscientious citizens can no longer give moral assent to the existing regime."

  Yet Neuhaus nevertheless gave moral assent to the laws that protected his own rights and liberties.

• Why Edmund Burke would have taken issue with Jeff Hart, by Roger Kimball. (New Criterion: "Armavirumque" Dec. 31, 2005). The managing editor of the Criterion responds to Hart's suggestion that the normalization of abortion reflects the achievement of "the women's movement":

  The "privatization" of abortion--that moral metamorphosis according to which abortion would henceforth be regarded not as an enormity but as liberating "choice"--was part of the cultural revolution of the 1960s. In this sense, I believe, the normalization of abortion represented not the fulfillment of the woman's movement but its most terrible subversion. It seduced many women--many men, too--into believing that ending a life was a legitimate, often a "courageous" expression of personal freedom.

  I was surprised--a little shocked, even--to find Jeff colluding with this idea by citing with apparent approval the Sixties euphemism according to which abortion is rebaptized as a woman's taking control of her "reproductive capability." What abortion really means is annulling reproductive capability in the name of a spurious notion of personal autonomy. There is something Orwellian about the fact that the slogan "reproductive freedom" has turned out so often to mean "freedom from reproducing." . . .

  Jeff stresses, with some exasperation, that he is offering a political analysis, not a blueprint for his ideal society. I do not see that that changes the fundamental issue, though. In a democratic polity, political power is (at least in theory) widely distributed. Political power is the power to determine to some extent the shape of society. It is not the power to define morality, which precedes and guides political power. If voters in some society voted to make murder legal, that would not mean that murder would henceforth be morally OK. The fact that Adolf Hitler was duly elected by democratic franchise in 1933 illustrates one of the limits of that emollient epithet, "democracy."

  as well as Hart's portrayal of Burke has having resigned himself to the consequences of the French Revolution (suggesting in like manner we make our peace with the new order lest we appear 'perverse and obstinate'"):

  Jeff attempts to enlist Burke in a policy of resignation. But few figures in the annals of conservative thought are less likely accomplices in such an enterprise. Jeff seems to argue that because Roe v. Wade enjoys the sanction of popular sentiment (if it does enjoy that sanction, which some would dispute), it therefore ought to be accepted. "Facts of the social reality have changed a great deal," Jeff reminds us, "and actual people make actual decisions within the actuality they inhabit." Well, does the fact that a certain practice is popular legitimate it? Burke had it right, I think, when he warned in An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791) that "the votes of a majority of the people, whatever their infamous flatterers may teach in order to corrupt their minds, cannot alter the moral any more than they can alter the physical essence of things."

• On January 2, 2006, Fr. Neuhaus reponded further to Jeffrey Hart:

  Jeff writes: “Robert Bork objected to Neuhaus’s observation that we ‘have reached the point where conscientious citizens can no longer give moral assent to the existing regime.’” Stubborn fact: I never said that, and I rather doubt that Robert Bork ever said that I said that. I said that, if the judicial usurpation of politics, as exemplified by Roe, continued unabated, we could reach a point at which the American polity would become an illegitimate regime. The manifest purpose of the symposium was to contribute to abating the judicial usurpation of politics. Those with a greater respect for facts than Jeffrey Hart has exhibited in these exchanges are invited to press the “Search” button above and read the entire symposium in order to find out who said what.

• On January 3, 2006 Jody Bottum weighs in on Hart vs. Neuhaus, Kimball, et al. (First Things "On The Square"). Bottum notes that "The Republicans’ adoption of the pro-life cause was one of the great moves in American political history," howbeit an adoption that occured almost by default when the Democrats enthusiastically rushed headlong to become the political lobby of NOW and Planned Parenthood. "The day the party abandons its pro-life platform is the day the pro-lifers stay home on election day—and the Democrats start to win again," challenges Bottum, "Is this what Jeffrey Hart wants? The decadent luxury of a purer, though powerless, party?"

  At the same time, says Bottom, Hart's criticisms have provoked in their own way a necessary evaluation of the relationship between conservatism and the pro-life cause ("We seem to need to go through this kind of brouhaha every so often, if only to get the argument straight once again"):

  One of the primary works of the pro-life movement has been the long, slow assembling of the intellectual argument against the killing of the unborn (a point made well by Slate.com’s William Saletan in his interesting 2003 book Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the Abortion War). And these occasional outbreaks of conservative disenchantment with the pro-life movement help us remember the intricacies of that argument—and its relation to deep structures of politics. . . .

  Hart is surely right that [conservative opposition to abortion] shares little of the conservative temperament. Fortunately, the modern pro-life movement in the United States is not dominated by its sentiment, in the political sense of the word. Its commitments remain instead radically above and below all that: a philosophical belief in the dignity of the human person asserted by Western civilization and (very approximately) embodied in the American experiment, on the one hand, and a practical association with mostly Republican politicians, on the other hand.

  This looks like sufficient conservatism to me. But give Jeffrey Hart his due: If conservatism is fundamentally a political sentiment, a temperament that accepts and defends the world as given, then the pro-life position now, three decades after Roe v. Wade, is not conservative but radical.

Additional Commentary on the Jeffrey Hart Debate

• Synthesizing a Running Debate: Hart's New Conservative Consensus, by Marc at Spinning Cleo Dec. 28, 2005: "What follows is an experiment in which I attempted to "liveblog" a running commentary and debate amongst different bloggers across different blogs about different aspects of the same topic. . . . This post encompasses comments made during the course of approximately 36 hours of blog debate and (due to sanity reasons!) was terminated at around 8pm, EST on 12/28/2005."

• Con-fusion: Prudence and Principle in Contemporary Conservatism, by Joseph Knippenberg, professor of politics and blogger at No Left Turns. The American Enterprise. Knippenberg finds some disjuncture between Hart's call for "a recovery of the great structure of metaphysics, with the Resurrection as its fulcrum" and his pragmatic concession to the demand for abortion:

  While Hart hasn’t given us much to go on, there seems to be a tension between his religion, which is universal and metaphysical, and his politics, which is grounded in particularity and concrete social facts. If the former is not supposed to have any influence on the latter, if the sphere of religion is supposed simply to be separate from the sphere of politics, then why mention religion at all in an essay on the conservative movement?

  I assume that Hart is not a mere separationist, simple-mindedly insisting upon the privacy of religion and banishing it from the public square. Religion is necessary and important and perhaps even true, capturing something of the human condition, addressing some of our deepest needs. If that is the case, then it will inevitably affect our attitude toward political life, albeit not necessarily in a straightforward or predictable way. It will challenge our subjection to seemingly inexorable material forces. It will call us away from our interests to our principles, to “the better angels of our nature.” But if it potentially has this effect, then it might at some point militate against a regime that permits abortion on demand during the first trimester.

• The Metaphysics of Conservatism TCS Daily. January 12, 2006. Edward Feser of Right Reason subjects Hart's article to philosophical analysis, finding him to be an example of Anti-Realist conservatism (one who "does not really oppose liberal measures per se, but only their overhasty and excessively disruptive implementation").

• Hart to Hart, by Amy Welborn. Discussion of Hart's article by the readers of Amy Welborn's blog Open Book. (Rod Dreher, a frequent contributor and author of Crunchy Con, notes "I'm probably closer to Jeff Hart's view on the abortion question than my own side's," noticing as well Hart's criticism of contemporary conservatism "for making a fetish of the free market" and neglect of Beauty.

Fr. Neuhaus & Caleb Stegall - A Brief Exchange

Natural Law, the Death Penalty, and Political Theology: An Editorial Response to First Things, by Caleb Stegall. The New Pantagruel Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 2005. Analyzing the recent correspondence of First Things editor Jody Bottum and editor-in-chief Fr. Richard J. Neuhaus, Caleb Stegall observes a disjuncture of positions:

So what’s going on at First Things? In sum, Bottum contends that accepting the modern state requires the abandonment of any political theology and the concurrent abandonment of natural law in favor of the positive law. Bottum does accept the modern state and therefore is compelled, by intellectual honesty, to abandon man’s experience under nature and within a cosmic narrative, at least in its political form. Neuhaus, on the other hand, contends that to abandon political theology altogether is social suicide, resulting in politics as naked power grabs and constant warfare by other means, and he prescribes as a remedy a renewed attention to natural law.

If it is true that a demythologized modern state has no room for political theology or natural law as Bottum says, and if it is true that a state without a political theology will devolve into raw power politics, either in the open or more likely hidden behind lip service paid to positive law, as Neuhaus says, then the sheer circularity of their contradictory conclusions is dizzying. The fact that Bottum and Neuhaus are so hung up in this intellectual feedback loop is useful for what it reveals: namely, that despite all the valiant efforts of the First Things crew over the years, the modern public square really is naked–which is to say, shorn of any real political theology or mythology–and will always remain so. Better to abandon the liberal project altogether, at which point a penitent, Christian, political theology will again be possible.

Fr. Neuhaus offers a rather curt response here:

Stegall’s is an interesting argument, and he raises a few questions deserving of detailed attention. But that is for another time. Very briefly, what he calls the demythologized modern state is not capable of bearing “the story of the world,” namely, the gospel of Jesus Christ. No state is. That is the mission of the Church. I am not at all sure that we should want the kind of “political theology” that Mr. Stegall apparently has in mind. The goal, rather, is a secular state in a confessional society in which government is democratically held accountable to the moral truth to which the Church bears witness.

While Mr. Bottum and I decline the invitation to fight, it should be noted that the New Pantagruel, while not as Rabelaisian as the title may suggest, is a lively Internet quarterly well worth a look.

(Well, let's hope for more substantial engagements in the future).

Religious Convictions and Public Discourse (Discussion w. Chris Burgwald)

NOTE: This is continuation of my earlier post "On Liberalism: Discussion w. Chris Burgwald", addressing his post on the proposition 'Liberalism is the Death of God'. The use of religious language in public debates and the problem of pluralism was the focus of an exchange btw/ Chris Burgwald and Santiago in the comments to his post on liberalism. What follows are some extended reflections in response to these issues, put down over the course of the past week -- CB

Regarding Chris' mention of the Enlightenment desire to construct 'a public morality' without any reference whatsoever to religion, and acceptable to anyone with the basic ability to think" -- one of the questions that I was prompted to ask: wither the concept of natural law as a medium for communication between Christians and non-Christians?

On one hand, natural law is rooted in religion (there can be no 'law' without a lawgiver). But at the same time, isn't it posited that by human reason we have the ability to know the requirements of natural law without the explicit assistance of divine revelation? While there is no question that many Christians are deficient in bearing witness to the Good News and the call to evangelize, does it necessarily follow that engagement in public discourse is not worthy of our time unless one's position on this or that issue is given explicit grounding on religious convictions? -- Fr. Neuhaus is resistant to this notion, and for good reason:

Schindler says the NWN gang, following Murray, claim that they are engaged in public discourse and therefore must make their arguments accessible to all reasonable persons, irrespective of their theological convictions or lack thereof. That, according to Schindler, is just the problem. A full-bore, undiluted presentation of Catholic truth is unapologetically aimed at converting people to that truth. He asks, "Would not an ethic that held less demand for conversion have a greater chance for widespread success?" He does not deny that, but simply responds by quoting Balthasar that "success is not a Gospel category."

So much for the task of trying to construct a comprehensive public discourse based upon reason and moral law. Attempting that is a liberal delusion, according to Schindler. It is worse than futile; it inevitably results in a betrayal of the fullness of the truth. Schindler's position is in key respects a Catholic version of the position of R. J. Rushdoony and the theonomists among Calvinists and of Stanley Hauerwas in his more intemperate moments. In their view, a genuinely public discourse is an oxymoron. Although they may use the same words, between Christian and non-Christian (maybe, for Schindler, between Catholic and non-Catholic) there is no commensurable discourse. The Catholic intellectual should simply bear witness to the fullness of truth in the hope of converting others to it. Although he denies it, Schindler is, like the theonomists, disposed toward a monism that cannot abide the pluralism that is history before the End Time.

NOTE: On this issue, I recommend the following for further consideration:

• God’s Reasons: Do appeals to religious authority have a role in public policy debates?, by Robert P. George. McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University and author of Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis (Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2001). Dr. George strikes me as a good example if any of a Catholic who wields the natural law tradition effectively in engaging non-Catholics/non-Christians in policy debates in the public square.

  
  

• Christian Conviction & Democratic Etiquette, by George Weigel. First Things 41 (March 1994): 28-35. Weigel asks: "How do we talk the talk? How, that is, do we talk so that moral judgments born from Christian religious conviction can be heard and thoughtfully considered by all Americans-or at least by those Americans willing to concede that moral judgment plays a crucial role in the public policy process?"

  
  

• An example of this issue comes into play was the 2004 Presidential elections. As you might recall, John Kerry never tired of defending his "pro-choice" stance on grounds that while he was a Catholic, with respect to the question of abortion (and human cloning and embryonic stem-cell research), he would as a matter of principle refrain from "imposing" religious convictions on the general public. In April 2004, George Weigel weighed in on this matter as follows:

  "What belongs to everyone, since this is a national candidacy, is the responsibility to make clear that when Kerry says the Church's pro-life teaching is a sectarian position which cannot be imposed on a pluralistic society, he is willfully misrepresenting the nature of the Church's position -- by suggesting that this is something analogous to the Catholic Church trying to force everyone in the United States to abstain from eating hot dogs on Fridays during Lent."

  "This is simply false. The Church's pro-life teaching is something that can be engaged seriously by anyone. You don't have to believe that there are seven sacraments to deal with this, you don't have to believe in the primacy of the bishop of Rome to engage this position. You don't even have to believe in God to engage this [pro-Life] position because it's a position rooted in basic embryology and in basic logic, and anybody can engage that."

  Q: Is this a suitable and legitimate mode of reasoning for a Catholic in public debate? What would David Jones or Chris Burgwald say? What would Schindler say?

On "Liberalism" - Discussion w. Chris Burgwald

Chris Burgwald picks up on the conversation begun at La Nouvelle Theologie with the first in a series of posts elaborating on the reasons for disagreement with Michael Novak (together with Fr. Neuhaus, George Weigel, and Fr. Sirico). The first of these posts to Veritas is on the proposition: "The death of God for our times, for our culture, for us, is Liberalism".

The 'liberalism' which is condemned by Chris and David Jones (and those whom I'll refer to as 'The Schindler camp') is "characterized by the autonomy of the individual, which results in the individual as the primary focal point of every form of discourse: political, social, cultural, religious, etc," citing as an example the inordinant emphasis on "rights talk" in public discourse, on unrestrained human autonomy or individualism.

At the risk of stating the obvious, but there is nothing to be deplored in the mere affirmation of human rights -- George Weigel has recounted a story from the early 1980's, when Sir Michael Howard, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, suggested in a conversation that there had been two great twentieth-century revolutions: the first the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 (culminating in failure); the second the ongoing "evolution of the Catholic Church into the world's premier institutional defender of human rights," especially under the pontificate of Pope John Paul II.

In Memory and Identity, Pope John Paul II -- no shrinking violet when it comes to criticism of liberalism -- praised as "the positive fruit of the Enlightenment" the ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity, and a better understanding of human rights: the rights of man as well as of nations, "to maintain their own culture and exercise political sovereignty." He oberves the significant proximity of the French Revolution (July 14, 1789), the proclamation of the Polish constitution (May 3, 1791) and the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America (July 4, 1776), and the "stimulating synthesis of the relation between Christianity and the Enlightenment" as found in the documents of the Second Vatican Council.

So, I think it is important to note the recognition of legitimate human rights by the contemporary Catholic Church, even as these are distinguished from the illusory rights born of a false notion of human autonomy (the disasterous judicial reasoning behind Roe v. Wade comes readily to mind).

Chris goes on to add that "individualism is not the only feature of liberalism: the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre is well-known for his critique of what he calls "the Enlightenment project."

MacIntyre uses this term to describe the attempt by Enlightenment philosophers to construct a 'public morality' accessible to reason alone, i.e. without any reference whatsoever to religion and acceptable to anyone with the basic ability to think. (MacIntyre convincingly demonstrates how such a project is an ultimately futile one.) This, too, tends to define liberalism broadly understood.

In "Beyond Liberalism: Human Dignity, the Free Society, and the Second Vatican Council" (pp. 29-58. Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism, Rowman & Littlefield, 1995) Kenneth L. Grasso reminds us that if we understand liberalism in the broad sense to consist of that which is "supportive of constitutionalism, limited government, the rule of law, etc., over and against absolutism," it would not be inappropriate to describe the political teaching of the Second Vatican Council as liberal -- what John Courtney Murray described as "a political commmitment, however discrete, to constitutional government" -- a "preferential option" for constitutional democracy (Grasso, p. 30).

But the other kind of liberalism -- that which emerged in the seventeenth century and became constitutive of modern Western thought, which Grasso summarizes as "that theory of man and society that combines a methodological rejection of teleology with an emphatic rejection of any notion of natural or God-given goals," is rightly to be condemned. It is this form of liberalism that is characterized by "a view of human beings as essentially sovereign wills ["unencumbered selves"], subject to no order of obligations not of their own creation, subject to no order of human ends that obligate independent of, and prior to, an act of free consent to strive for these ends." (Grasso, p. 45).

Chris goes on to note that liberalism in the sense he describes it "encompasses the vast majority of political discourse in our country today; virtually all of those people who describe themselves as liberal and conservative are actually liberals in this broad sense." He explains why it is considered the 'death of God' in modern times:

Now, why is liberalism understood in this sense the death of God for our times? Because of its amazing capacity to create and sustain (false) antagonistic dualisms, e.g. faith and reason; body and soul; church and state; religion and life. Note well: I'm certainly not denying that each element of each pair of terms is distinguishable from the other -- that's obviously true. My point here is that liberalism doesn't merely distinguish between (for example) faith and reason: rather, it puts them in opposition to one another at a fundamental level.

What we're talking about here is secularism: the view that denies religion's intrinsically pervasive nature. Secularism tries to create the "naked public square," i.e. to make religion a purely private matter without bearing and impact on the public life of a nation. I would argue that secularism is one of the logical consequences of liberalism, in spite of the fact that some liberals (e.g. conservative liberals) might themselves be vociferous opponents of secularism. In other words, there is a logic of liberalism which inexorably works itself out, whatever the positive and good intentions of individual liberals.

I find that definitions are key to this discussion. "Liberalism," as Fr. Neuhaus wryly notes in his response to Dr. Schindler, "is a wonderfully pliant term." It runs the gambit from the the laissez-faire economic liberalism (condemned by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum) to the libertarianism "which remains in the largest part a thought experiment for college sophomores of all ages" -- and one has only to take a survey of the many varieties of liberalism through the ages to notice the distinctions between them.

A number of the sources I have mentioned this past week in the context of our discussion here and at La Nouvelle Theologie concern those scholars who demonstrate that the thought of our founding fathers on the interaction of 'faith and reason', 'church and state,' 'religion and life' is a far cry from the secularism of contemporary liberals. While the experience of strife between religions motivated them to establish a boundary between 'church and state', their writings reveal that they did not see them in mutual opposition. (Indeed, they would likely be rolling in their graves at the antics of the ACLU). Likewise, they demonstrate that the founding principles of this nation have far more in common with Catholic tradition than some today would care to admit.

Among such resources cited are: Fr. Hunter ("Catholics and the Republic"), Fr. John C. Rager ("Catholic Sources of the Declaration"), the reflections of Fr. John Courtney Murray, the contemmporary research of Michael Novak (On Two Wings: Humble Faith and Common Sense at the American Founding), and -- thanks to David Jones for the introduction -- Scott McDermott (on the person of Charles Carroll, the only Catholic signer of the Declaration of Independence). Novak's On Two Wings stands out as one of the best compilations of the founders' real thought on religion in public life -- one that he "wanted to write for some forty years," if not for his ignorance, "convential (but mistaken) wisdom" and the many "erroneous perceptions . . . unconsciously drunk from public perception." I heartily recommend it.

* * *

There are two articles by Fr. Neuhaus which were written in response to the criticism of Dr. Schindler in Heart of the World:

• Schindler's Complaint First Things 74 (June/July 1997): 68-86.
• The Liberalism of John Paul II First Things 73 (May 1997): 16-21.

In the latter post, Neuhaus expresses a concern with the sweeping condemnation of liberalism and its implications for Catholic engagement in the public square:

"The burden of the present book," he writes, "is to suggest that liberalism cannot so easily claim the moral authority of Catholicism, and, at the same time, to indicate why an increasing liberal hegemony throughout the world should be viewed not altogether with favor but, on the contrary, with a certain alarm." Well, yes, if, like Schindler, one puts the worst possible construction on liberalism' meaning the American founding, liberal democracy, and market economics. And that is what Schindler tends to do. Liberalism is condemned tout court as a dogmatic system premised upon radical individualism, the autonomous self, calculated self-interest, and human creativity as opposed to receptivity to God's grace. In sum, Schindler starts out by agreeing with those who construe the liberal tradition -- and its chief historical instantiation, the American experiment -- along rigorously secularist and un-Christian (maybe anti-Christian) lines. Those of us who defend the "Murray Project" might easily turn around and charge Schindler with selling out the American store to the enemies of the faith. I am not about to join him in giving up the argument and letting Laurance Tribe or the ACLU define the meaning of liberal democracy.

Both essays are well worth reading, addressing the conflicting understandings of liberalism and the Catholic Church's engagement with the liberal tradition in the thought of John Paul II (particularly in Centesimus Annus (which Neuhaus rightly points out is not so much a document on economic questions as it is about the nature of the free society).

As there is too much in Neuhaus' dual response to simply recount in the space of this blog, I recommend reading them with Chris Burgwald's post in mind, along with the recent discussions with David Jones and company.

Next Post: Religious Convictions in Public Discourse

Memo to TCRNews: Context Matters

TCRNews's blog -- by way of la nouvelle théologie -- posts a rather curt Memo to the Acton Institute from John Paul II":

It is unacceptable to say that the defeat of 'Real Socialism' leaves capitalism as the only mode of economic organization. --Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus

In response, Santiago posts this quote from Michael Novak -- a good and necessary reminder to those in the habit of portraying Novak as an indiscriminate apologist for unbridled capitalism:

"Having always resented such moral imperialism as Paul Tillich's 'Every serious Christian must be a socialist,' and the British left's 'Christianity is the religion of which socialism is the practice,' I would by no means support he sentiment that "Every serious Christian must be a democratic capitalist," or that "Christianity is the religion of which democratic capitalism is the practice." As Centesiums Annus insists, the Catholic Church 'has no models to offer'--and, indeed, has powerful reasons to criticize many abuses and wrongs in the democratic capitalist societies. The Pope rightly insists that no worldly system can ever claim to be the Kingdom of God. What good would a Church be if it didn't constantly criticize the City of Man in the light of the City of God, sub specie aeternitatis? Indeed, as Thomas Pangle repots in his study of Tocqueville's Democracy in America, this emphasis on immortality and eternal life is the indispensable contribution of religion to the democratic experiment."

Michael Novak, The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1993. Ppg. 142-143 of Part 2, "A New Birth of Freedom: John Paul II," in the section titled, "Toward a More Civil Debate."

* * *

One might also add the following Initial reactions to Centesimus Annus by our favorite neocons (Neuhaus and Novak, Weigel in absentia), as compiled by The Acton Institute:

• From Richard John Neuhaus (First Things):

  "While Centesimus Annus is a ringing affirmation of the free economy, there is nothing in it to justify complacency among the friends of capitalism. Socialism is dead, but 'the new capitalism' has hardly met the challenges raised by the pope."

• From Michael Novak (The Washington Post, May 7, 1991):

  "The pope's splendid new encyclical. . . . adds a new characteristic to his defense of liberty. It has been clear for many years that Pope John Paul II supports democratic institutions more than any previous pope and sees them as the best way to secure human rights. It has also been clear to some that he supports a type of 'reformed capitalism.' But this new encyclical makes clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that the pope endorses the 'business economy,' the 'market economy,' or simply the 'free economy' as the goal he now proposes for formerly Communist and Third World societies. . . .

  "The institutional limitations on capitalism on which the pope insists are two: first, a juridical framework that protects other fundamental liberties besides economic liberty; and, second, a grounding of all liberties in a moral and religious core. In short, the economic system must be limited by a democratic polity and by a strong set of moral and cultural institutions. . . . Only in this way will it, better than other systems, meet basic needs and constantly raise the level of the common good of peoples. . . .

  "The pope's greatest originality . . . may lie in going beyond questions of politics and economics to questions of morality and culture. In a sense, the political argument of the 20th century has been resolved in favor of capitalism. Thinking of the chief battleground of the next century, the pope turns to the disappointing use that existing free societies are now making of their freedom. He turns to the inadequacies of modern culture and morals. . . .

  "You can tell the quality and depth of a nation's culture, the pope trenchantly states, by observing what it produces and consumes. This simple remark imposes a new moral accountability on capitalist firms, advertisers and media. In this century, the pope thinks free peoples have neglected their responsibilities to the quality of the moral atmosphere, the cultural ecology in which they try to raise their children and to be faithful to their destiny of free citizens. . . .

  "This is a great encyclical. It will release enormous energies in Eastern Europe, the Third World and advanced societies. It should read as well in 2091 as Leo XIII's accurate predictions about socialism in 1891 still read today. No other world leader could have produced such a profound tour d'horizon. Get a copy and see for yourself. You will be glad you did."

* * *

Returning to the paragraph of which Stephen Hand cited only the first sentence, let's study it for a minute in its entirety:

We have seen that it is unacceptable to say that the defeat of so-called "Real Socialism" leaves capitalism as the only model of economic organization. It is necessary to break down the barriers and monopolies which leave so many countries on the margins of development, and to provide all individuals and nations with the basic conditions which will enable them to share in development. This goal calls for programmed and responsible efforts on the part of the entire international community. Stronger nations must offer weaker ones opportunities for taking their place in international life, and the latter must learn how to use these opportunities by making the necessary efforts and sacrifices and by ensuring political and economic stability, the certainty of better prospects for the future, the improvement of workers' skills, and the training of competent business leaders who are conscious of their responsibilities.

I would posit that the above recommendation is wholeheartedly supported by the Acton Institute, Fr. Neuhaus and Michael Novak -- the latter of course contending that the best way to rescue individuals from material poverty is to open the doors of opportunity to small business with proper training and support -- or, in the words of John Paul II, enabling them to "acquire expertise, to enter the circle of exchange, and to develop their skills in order to make the best use of their capacities and resources."

Nevertheless, the "Whig Thomists" readily acknowledge that "free market" -- for all of its great potential -- is not without its flaws, and that John Paul II's endorsement of "the business economy" was a cautious and justifiably qualified endorsement.

To pursue this further, the Pope reminds us "there are many human needs which find no place on the market" -- and that in certain Third World contexts, the objectives specified by Rerum Novarum still remain valid and even constitute a goal "yet to be reached, if man's work and his very being are not to be reduced to the level of a mere commodity." Among these objectives are a sufficient wage for the support of the family, social insurance for old age and unemployment, and adequate protection for the conditions of employment.

The Pope goes on to affirm the legitimacy of trade unions and other workers' organizations in their demand for such rights:

In this sense, it is right to speak of a struggle against an economic system, if the latter is understood as a method of upholding the absolute predominance of capital, the possession of the means of production and of the land, in contrast to the free and personal nature of human work. In the struggle against such a system, what is being proposed as an alternative is not the socialist system, which in fact turns out to be State capitalism, but rather a society of free work, of enterprise and of participation. Such a society is not directed against the market, but demands that the market be appropriately controlled by the forces of society and by the State, so as to guarantee that the basic needs of the whole of society are satisfied.

Likewise, while acknowledging the legitimate role of profit as indication of a successful business, John Paul II reminds us that "profitability is not the only indicator of a firm's condition":

. . . It is possible for the financial accounts to be in order, and yet for the people -- who make up the firm's most valuable asset -- to be humiliated and their dignity offended. Besides being morally inadmissible, this will eventually have negative repercussions on the firm's economic efficiency. In fact, the purpose of a business firm is not simply to make a profit, but is to be found in its very existence as a community of persons who in various ways are endeavouring to satisfy their basic needs, and who form a particular group at the service of the whole of society. Profit is a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not the only one; other human and moral factors must also be considered which, in the long term, are at least equally important for the life of a business.

Note -- It is interesting here that the Pope's characterization of a company as a "community of persons" and his criteria for a business to be considered genuinely successful by demonstrating behavior above and beyond the task of earning profit is not unlike that laid out by Michael Novak's advice to businessmen in Toward Business as a Calling: Work and the Examined Life:

. . . business as a mediating institution has seven internal responsibilities that arise from the nature of the corporation itself and an additional seven external responsibilities that are derived from Judeo-Christian religious teaching. In order to succeed, a business must: (1) satisfy customers with goods and services of real value; (2) make a reasonable return on the resources entrusted to it by investors; (3) create new wealth; (4) create new jobs; (5) defeat envy by generating upward mobility and by demonstrating that talent and hard work will be rewarded; (6) promote inventiveness and ingenuity; and (7) diversify the interests of the republic, thus guarding against majoritarian tyranny.

The following additional external responsibilities are not found in business as business but in the convictions of its practitioners who bring their faith to the business world: (1) to shape a corporate culture that fosters the three cardinal business virtues ["creativity", "community" and "practical realism"] as well as other virtues; (2) to protect the political soil of liberty; (3) to exemplify respect for the rule of law; (4) to reflect and act in practical effective ways, individually and with others, in order to improve aspects of society; (5) to communicate often and fully with investors, pensioners, customers, and employers; (6) to voluntarily contribute toward the improvement of civil society; and (7) to protect the moral ecology of freedom.

[Summarized in Michael Novak's Portrait of Democratic Capitalism, Edward W. Younkins Markets & Morality Volume 2, Number 1. Spring 1999].

* * *

So whether one speaks of the "Whig Thomist's" endorsement of capitalism or John Paul II's oppostion to it, context matters -- and one cannot stress the necessity of examining the source to get the whole picture.

I'll close with John Paul II's address of the initial passage -- a lengthy citation, but bear with me, as he returns once again to the question:

. . . can it perhaps be said that, after the failure of Communism, capitalism is the victorious social system, and that capitalism should be the goal of the countries now making efforts to rebuild their economy and society? Is this the model which ought to be proposed to the countries of the Third World which are searching for the path to true economic and civil progress?

The answer is obviously complex. If by "capitalism" is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, even though it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a "business economy", "market economy" or simply "free economy". But if by "capitalism" is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it at the service of human freedom in its totality, and which sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and religious, then the reply is certainly negative.

The Marxist solution has failed, but the realities of marginalization and exploitation remain in the world, especially the Third World, as does the reality of human alienation, especially in the more advanced countries. Against these phenomena the Church strongly raises her voice. Vast multitudes are still living in conditions of great material and moral poverty. The collapse of the Communist system in so many countries certainly removes an obstacle to facing these problems in an appropriate and realistic way, but it is not enough to bring about their solution. Indeed, there is a risk that a radical capitalistic ideology could spread which refuses even to consider these problems, in the a priori belief that any attempt to solve them is doomed to failure, and which blindly entrusts their solution to the free development of market forces.

The Church has no models to present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations, through the efforts of all those who responsibly confront concrete problems in all their social, economic, political and cultural aspects, as these interact with one another. For such a task the Church offers her social teaching as an indispensable and ideal orientation, a teaching which, as already mentioned, recognizes the positive value of the market and of enterprise, but which at the same time points out that these need to be oriented towards the common good. This teaching also recognizes the legitimacy of workers' efforts to obtain full respect for their dignity and to gain broader areas of participation in the life of industrial enterprises so that, while cooperating with others and under the direction of others, they can in a certain sense "work for themselves" through the exercise of their intelligence and freedom.

P.S. But don't take my word for it. As Novak says: "Get a copy and see for yourself. You will be glad you did."

Any discussion of Church and society that is not marked by a sympathetic awareness of the sectarian option is not to be fully trusted. In Catholicism, the monastic tradition keeps alive the awareness that there is a radically "other way," and that, in some circumstances of cultural disintegration and hostility to the Gospel, it may be the best way, indeed the normative way. No matter how impressive its institutions or how large its numbers or how palpable its cultural influence, the Church must never forget that it is, in the final analysis, the "little flock" completely dependent on the promise of its Lord.

Fr. Richard J. Neuhaus, forward to Building a Free Society (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 1993). xvi.

Ceasefire? -- Hardly, but it's a start.

In the April 1999 issue of First Things, Fr. Richard J. Neuhaus notes a symposium published in the The Catholic Social Science Review on "David Schindler vs. Neoconservatism". One of the contributors, Mark Lowry of the University of Dallas, offered an overview of the controversy and "concludes with a list of propositions to which he thinks all parties -- Schindler, Novak, Neuhaus and Weigel -- could agree":

a. While the Church respects the proper autonomy of the temporal order and never favors any one particular political regime in principle, the liberal state is compatible, in practice, with Catholicism, as articulated in Dignitatis Humanae.

b. The extent to which the liberal political order is a good setting for the Catholic faith is a legitimate matter for continued discussion. The "Catholic Moment" theory ought not be construed in such a way as to suggest that the liberal regime is necessarily the ideal home for the Catholic faith in this world, even if it is the best available home at the present time.

c. The liberal state is something of an indeterminate and, hence, vulnerable entity. While in its current American manifestation it is less than promising, it contains a capacity for improvement. Liberal ideology need not accompany liberal institutions.

d. Concretely speaking, the liberal regime, for all its vulnerabilities, is the best political option currently available. This is not to say that the Church endorses it (a strategic alliance) as her favored choice of all conceivable political regimes, which would violate the Church's principle regarding the proper autonomy of the temporal order.

e. The liberal state in America will never totally harmonize with the richness of the Catholic onto-logic (nor could any temporal regime); still, the cultural dimension of a liberal regime (as well as the economic and political dimensions insofar as they are affected by the cultural dimension) can participate in that logic. While shunning a strategic alliance with liberalism, we can make varying kinds of tactical alliances with it.

f. The degree of that participation, and the ways in which such participation might be increased, is an important matter for continued discussion. Varying kinds of tactical alliances can and should exist side by side. Undoubtedly, a Protestant ethos pervades much of American life, but even that ethos can and does participate in Catholic truth, and can be nourished by contact with the Catholic tradition.

g. Catholics should strive to bring the fullness of their faith to their engagement in the temporal order, even though the temporal order never will echo perfectly that fullness (the "eschatological principle" in Catholic social thought).

h. Because that faith is so much under siege, we must be especially dedicated to work in harmony with one another, nourished by a theological and pastoral magnanimity within the parameters of the authentic Catholic faith.

Neuhaus remarks: "I might have an editorial quibble with a phrase or two, but sign me on. I haven't checked with Novak or Weigel, but would be surprised if they did not agree."

I could easily envision the so-called "neoconservatives" nodding their agreement to this list of nuanced propositions. Based on what I've read -- and haven't read a great deal, although I hope to remedy that during the remainder of this summer -- I have a difficult time envisioning David Schindler or Tracy Rowland giving their consent. But it's something worth discussing.

George Weigel on Neuhaus' The Naked Public Square

In his weekly column, George Weigel recently took a look at Fr. Richard J. Neuhaus' The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, twenty years after its publication:

The Naked Public Square brilliantly analyzed a discomfort that many Americans felt but couldn't quite identify precisely. Something seemed out-of-kilter in the matter of Church-and-state; but what was it? Neuhaus argued that what the Framers intended as one constitutional "religion clause" -- in order to foster the free exercise of religion in the United States, the Federal government will not sponsor a national church -- had gotten divided into two "religion clauses." Once "no establishment" and "free exercise" were sundered, the organic connection between forbidding an established national church and encouraging the free exercise of religious faith was lost.

Then the "two clauses" were put into competition with each other. And, over the course of several decades of wrong-headed Supreme Court jurisprudence, "no establishment" claims became trumps, in the sense that many "free exercises" of religion, once thought entirely constitutional, were deemed violations of "no establishment." The annual fracas over créches in public parks at Christmas is but one of many examples.

Father Neuhaus (or Pastor Neuhaus, as the Lutheran-now-become-Catholic then was) thought this was not only wrong as law; he thought it was bad news for democracy. What would happen to our democracy, he asked, if the most deeply held convictions of the American people -- their religious convictions -- were ruled out-of-bounds in the "public square" where Americans decide how we ought to live together? Debate would be weakened, even deracinated; democratic commitments would atrophy; believers would become, in time, second-class citizens. So it was in everyone's interest -- believers and non-believers alike -- to protect the right of all citizens to bring the most profound sources of their moral judgments into public life. . . . READ MORE.

Neuhaus and the "reappropriation of the liberal tradition."

With respect to theology the neoconservatives and the 'Communio' school are largely in agreement with each other. Both are strong supporters of Pope John Paul II and steadfast in their commitment to the orthodox Catholic faith. As Neuhaus says, the debate between them boils down to the neoconservatives' support of 'The Murray Project' -- square Catholic teaching with the American democratic experiment [and free market capitalism] -- and the conservative critics like David Schindler who "accuse Murray and those like him of selling out authentic Catholic teaching to a desiccated and desiccating liberalism."

Neuhaus clarifies some points in his dispute with David Schindler in his article The Liberalism of John Paul II (First Things 73, May 1997). The article is a response to Schindler's book Heart of the World, Center of the Church, in which Schindler summarizes his argument in three points: 1) to "challenge the regnant liberalism which would claim that it (alone) is empty of religious theory in its interpretation of the First Amendment and indeed of Western constitutionalism more generally"; 2) to "seek a truly 'Catholic Moment' in America" -- after the teachings of John Paul II against John Courtney Murray; and 3) to "expose the con game of liberalism which enables it, precisely without argument, to privilege its place in the public order." Of course, Schindler and others believe Neuhaus & Novak to be implicit in this "con game of liberalism."

In an interview with David Schindler blogged earlier, he had said of self-interest: "Of course we can't suppress that impulse forcibly; if we try, we end up in totalitarianism. But that doesn't mean we should bless it as a virtue of necessity. The call to sanctity requires a transformation of self-interest and its replacement, insofar as possible, with love." One reader of this blog (Hank_F_M) challenged Schindler's conflation of self-interest with selfishness and greed:

Thomas Sowell (not a Catholic, but an influential neocon economist) in his book Knowledge and Decisions approaches [self interest] as each individual choosing the interest he serves and thus makes decisions on it. While the decision may be greed, it is often to do what is necessary to fulfil ones proper duties to family and society, and perhaps in some cases to altruistically serve the community beyond ones duties. (That is my summery of a key idea in the book)

This reduces the dichotomy that Schindler points out. If we are making decisions to respond to the call of sanctity and love in imitation of Christ then the economic and social systems should operate in a manner much more in a much more human manner. It also allows for intelligent decisions in the face of the fact others will not act accordingly and without imposing a totalitarian an unacceptable regime on them.

Neuhaus criticizes Schindler for having engaged in a similar reduction of "liberalism", putting

the worst possible construction upon the liberal tradition, and on the American cultural, legal, and political expression of that tradition. In doing so, . . . [handing] an undeserved victory to those who interpret the liberal tradition in ways that we all deplore. With John Courtney Murray, I suggest that our task is to contend for an interpretation of liberalism that is compatible with the fullness of Catholic truth. ¹

Liberalism, says Neuhaus, is "a very pliable term." Of the varieties that exists he notes the laissez-faire economic liberalism condemned by Pope Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum & John Paul II, the libertarianism of a political minority in American culture ("a thought experiment for college sophomores of all ages"), the "republican liberalism of virtue" and the "communitarian liberalism of Tocquevillian civil society".

Clarification of what one means by "liberalism" is imperative in this discussion, if not only because Neuhaus & his colleagues would actually agree with Dr. Schindler's critique of a certain kind of liberalism, or even that "Christian thinkers have been too ready to trim the Christian message in order to accommodate the ruling cultural paradigm of liberalism." Of the many criticisms of liberalism raised by Schindler and others -- that it is 'purely procedural', excluding a consideration of ends (and thus its claim to 'neutrality' inherently anti-religious); that it is premised entirely on self-interest, excluding consideration of transcendent truth or divine law; that it is "inextricably tied to the dynamics of capitalism" and condusive to a culture of rampant material consumerism -- Neuhaus maintains that these are not no much an indictment of liberalism per se but distortions of liberalism, and that he, Novak, Weigel and others are "contending for the soul of liberalism." This struggle is absolutely crucial, because

There is no going back to reconstitute the American order on a foundation other than the liberal tradition. A great chasm has opened between the liberal tradition and what today is called liberalism. That is why some of us are called conservatives. Conservatism that is authentically and constructively American conservatism is conservatism in the cause of reappropriating and revitalizing the liberal tradition.

Neuhaus devotes the latter part of his article to a proper understanding and appreciation of individualism in light of Pope John Paul II's teaching in Centesimus Annus (recommended as an "invaluable guide" to the revitalization of the liberal tradition). ² Noting that individualism developed in frequent tension and even conflict with the Catholic Church (perceiving it as radically anti-clerical and anti-Christian), Neuhaus credits John Paul II with having "replanted the idea of the individual and of freedom in the rich soil of Christian truth."

Concerning the human person, John Paul II cites an earlier encyclical Redemptor Hominis: "[the] human person is the primary route that the Church must travel in fulfilling her mission . . . the way traced out by Christ himself, the way that leads invariably through the mystery of the Incarnation and Redemption", to which is appended: "This, and this alone, is the principle which inspires the Church's social doctrine." (53) For Neuhaus, CA's recognition that man recovers and attains his dignity in responding to the call of God ("to transcendent truth"), can lead Catholics in America to appreciate individualism, properly understood and articulated in 'The American Experiment':

This is not individualism in the pejorative sense, but it is commensurable with the modern achievement of the idea of the individual. It is commensurable with the constituting ideas of the American experiment, in which the state is understood to be in the service of freedom, and freedom is understood as what the Founders called "ordered liberty"—liberty ordered to the truth. And there are, as the Declaration of Independence declares, "self-evident truths" that ground such freedom and direct it to the transcendent ends of "Nature and Nature's God."

Theistic references in the Declaration are not merely superficial allusions to appease the public; they are essential to the Founder's argument "that this constitutional order is premised upon moral truths secured by religion." As we can see in the numerous writings by Michael Novak, George Weigel and Fr. Neuhaus, re-discovering the religious vision of the Declaration and other writings of our founding fathers is a critical element of the Catholic re-appropriation of the liberal tradition. ³

Neuhaus' article is worth reading in full, as there are too many points to cover here. Altogether it is an excellent explication of Centesimus Annus and the specific goals of those 'neoconservatives' engaged in 'The Murray Project.'

---

1. Referring to our very first blog, Fr. Zieba contended that "there is liberalism and there is liberalism", the former distinguished by relativism and a radical autonomy free of moral constraints, the latter distinguished by an appreciation of freedom's relation to and dependance upon absolute truth. "The Liberalism That We Need", First Things 40 (Feb. 1994).

2. Those interested in Fr. Neuhaus' reading of Centesimus Annus might appreciate his Doing Well & Doing Good: The Challenge to the Christian Capitalist (Oct. 1992), or Michael Novak's The Catholic Ethic & The Spirit of Capitalism, both of which focus on the Pope's encyclical.

3. See, for example, Michael Novak's The Faith of the Founding (First Things April 2003), or his recent book: On Two Wings: Humble Faith and Common Sense at the American Founding (Encounter Books April 2003). See also "Christianity and Democracy", a formal statement written by Fr. Neuhaus in 981for the Institute on Religion & Democracy, "to set forth the Christian case for, and stake in, the liberal democratic order."